Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-003910
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/01910/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

15th October 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BLUNDELL

Between

MB
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Arafin, instructed via Direct Public Access
For the Respondent: Ms Nolan, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 15 October 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The outcome of this appeal is agreed between the parties and the decision which follows is in correspondingly short form. Anonymity was ordered by the First-tier Tribunal and that order shall remain in force because the appellant is an asylum seeker and the need to preserve her safety outweighs the presumption in favour of open justice.
2. The appellant is a 74 year old national of Bangladesh. She appeals with the permission of Judge Saffer against the decision of Judge Symes, who dismissed her appeal against the respondent’s refusal of her protection and human rights claims.
3. It is not necessary for the purposes of this decision to say very much about the nature of the claims presented to the Secretary of State. It suffices to note that the protection claim was based on a land dispute which had culminated in threats to kill and that the human rights claim was twofold, based on the appellant’s family ties to the UK and her ill health.
4. The respondent did not believe the protection claim and she did not accept that the appellant’s removal to Bangladesh would be unlawful under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998, whether with reference to Article 3 or Article 8 ECHR. The appellant appealed to the First-tier Tribunal against the refusal.
5. The appellant was unrepresented before the FtT. It seems that she had had some assistance from her family. The hearing was listed to be heard before Judge Symes (“the judge”) on 9 March 2026. On the morning of the hearing, the judge received an application to adjourn. It was said that the appellant had fallen and that she had been admitted to hospital. An adjournment of twelve weeks was sought.
6. The judge refused the adjournment application for reasons he gave at [9] of his decision:
I did not it consider it appropriate to grant this adjournment. This is not an appeal where there is any indication that a legal representative had been instructed or that the family were intending to attend before me today had this latest recent health misfortune not eventuated. No statement of case has been provided, simply a collation of medical documents which does not include any meaningful diagnosis or prognosis of the Appellant’s medical condition or future needs. It is of significant concern that in the period of over eighteen months since the asylum application’s refusal that nothing further has been advanced as to her asserted problems in Bangladesh, and that the family’s intention appears to be to rely on her poor health as the basis of her case now.
7. The first ground of appeal to the Upper Tribunal is that the judge acted unfairly in refusing the adjournment for those reasons. It was that ground which prompted Judge Saffer to grant permission to appeal; whilst he did not restrict the grant of permission to appeal, he thought that some of the other five grounds of appeal probably had very little merit.
8. At the outset of the hearing before me this afternoon, Ms Nolan indicated that she had spoken to Mr Arafin to explain that she had some concerns about the fairness of the judge’s refusal to adjourn. She indicated that she was minded to accept that the judge had unfairly attached weight to the absence of correspondence from the appellant to the tribunal and that he had also been in error in seizing upon the absence of any indication that the family were intending to attend the hearing. In circumstances in which the appellant was an elderly litigant in person who had requested an oral hearing with an interpreter, Ms Nolan was minded to accept that the judge had erred in these respects.
9. I indicated that I had the same concerns. As Ms Nolan had submitted, there was no reason for the judge to doubt that the appellant and her family had intended to attend the hearing. She had asked for an oral hearing and an interpreter and the judge seemingly accepted that the only reason she had not attended was that she had been admitted to hospital. Had the appellant been represented, it might have been of the utmost significance that there had been nothing from her in the eighteen months that the appeal was pending but that was probably of rather less significance in the circumstances of this case.
10. Applying the test in SH (Afghanistan) v SSHD [2011] EWCA Civ 1284, I accept that the judge acted unfairly in proceeding in the appellant’s absence. That conclusion suffices to vitiate the decision as a whole and I set the decision aside. The relief which must flow from that conclusion is that which both advocates suggested: the appeal must be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal to be heard afresh by a judge other than Judge Symes.

Notice of Decision
The appellant’s appeal is allowed. The decision of the FtT is set aside in full. The appeal is remitted to the FtT to be heard afresh by a different judge.

Mark Blundell

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

15 October 2026