UI-2026-003984
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The decision
IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-003984
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/60050/2024
PA/60050/2024
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Decision & Reasons Issued:
4th November 2026
Before
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BURGHER
Between
F A
(Anonymity direction made)
Appellant
and
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Fazli, Counsel
For the Respondent: Mr A Sheikh, Senior Presenting Officer
Heard at Field House by CVP on 22 October 2026
Order Regarding Anonymity
Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.
No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify them. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.
DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The Appellant appeals with permission against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge C Mather (“the Judge”), promulgated on 21 May 2026, dismissing his appeal on asylum, humanitarian protection and human rights grounds. Permission to appeal was granted by First-tier Tribunal Judge Stevenson on 20 July 2026 on all grounds.
2. The Appellant is a national of Afghanistan, born on 1 January 1994. He claimed asylum on 28 November 2022. His protection claim was refused by the Respondent on 28 March 2024.
3. Before the First-tier Tribunal, the Appellant's case was that he had served with the Afghan security forces and was consequently at risk from the Taliban. His evidence developed to the effect that he had initially served with the police from 2013 before joining the Afghan National Army in 2016. He maintained that relatives on his paternal side were members of the Taliban, that he and his family had been threatened and that his father-in-law had subsequently been killed by the Taliban. He relied upon documentary evidence concerning his claimed police and military service, photographs, supporting letters and an expert report from Professor Mario Aguilar dated 15 November 2025.
Anonymity Order
4. The Judge made an anonymity order. There was no request for it to be set aside. I conclude that the Appellant’s rights to international protection outweigh the public’s Article 10 interest in knowing his identity as a party to these proceedings.
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal
5. The Judge set out the Appellant's immigration history and evidence at paragraphs 2 and 11 to 45 of the decision. Paragraphs 46 to 60 set out her conclusions.
6. The Judge did not accept the Appellant as a credible witness. At paragraph 47 she described his evidence as “vague, inconsistent and evasive”. She identified differences between the Appellant's accounts concerning when he entered the Afghan army, when he left Afghanistan and the circumstances of his journey to the United Kingdom. Specifically:
6.1 At paragraphs 48 and 49 the Judge referenced the differing accounts of whether his military service commenced in 2013 or 2016.
6.2 At paragraph 50 the Judge addressed documentary evidence relied upon by the Appellant. She considered that his inconsistent evidence was compounded by what she described as “self serving and implausible documents” which had been submitted relatively late. She referred to documents bearing differing names and to the Taliban letter dated 2012, which pre-dated the Appellant's earliest claimed commencement of service in 2013. She also considered the photographic evidence and expressly stated that she had borne in mind Tanveer Ahmed.
6.3 At paragraph 51 the Judge identified inconsistencies concerning the position of the Appellant's family in Afghanistan, including the assertion that his wife and children were in hiding when national identification documents had been issued to them in November 2022.
6.4 At paragraph 52 the Judge addressed Professor Aguilar's report. She noted that he was a social anthropologist, that the documents supplied to him were PDFs and that he expressly disclaimed competence to verify the authenticity of Afghan documents. She stated that the expert had accepted the Appellant to be truthful and his documents reliable, but concluded that, given her preceding findings, she was not persuaded by his conclusions.
6.5 At paragraph 53 the Judge referenced the inconsistencies concerning the Appellant's journey and the documents carried by him, together with his failure to claim asylum in a safe country.
7. Ultimately, at paragraph 56, the Judge rejected the Appellant's account of events in Afghanistan and concluded that he had not established past persecution or a future risk of persecution.
The grounds of appeal
8. The Appellant advances four grounds.
8.1 Ground 1 concerns the Judge's treatment of Professor Aguilar's expert evidence. The Appellant submits that paragraph 52 was an inadequate engagement with a substantial expert report. It is argued that the Judge focused upon the expert's inability to authenticate Afghan documents but failed to address his evidence concerning the context of those documents, the Appellant's asserted inconsistencies, the plausibility of his claim and the risk faced by former members of the Afghan security forces. The Appellant contends that the Judge effectively rejected the expert evidence because she had already rejected the Appellant's credibility and fell into the error identified in Mibanga v SSHD [2005] EWCA Civ 367.
8.2 Ground 2 challenges the Judge's approach to inconsistencies and the adequacy of reasons. Reliance is placed upon SSHD v Maheshwaran [2002] EWCA Civ 173 and R (TVN) v SSHD [2021] EWHC 3019 (Admin). It is submitted that the Judge treated inconsistencies as effectively determinative of credibility without adequately considering the Appellant's explanations. Specific reliance is placed upon his explanation at paragraph 33 of the Judge’s decision that a language difficulty with an interpreter accounted for an earlier failure to properly distinguish his police service from subsequent army service.
8.3 Ground 3 concerns the approach to documentary evidence. The Appellant submits that the Judge impermissibly relied upon implausibility, referring to HK v SSHD [2006] EWCA Civ 1037, and failed adequately to assess the documents individually and in the round. The grounds identify, amongst other material, the Taliban threat letter, police training evidence, Ministry of Defence documentation, soldiers' certificates, identification documentation, training material, an appreciation letter and supporting letters from village elders and the Appellant's parents.
8.4 Ground 4 contends that the Judge failed to make a finding upon the Appellant's evidence that the Taliban killed his father-in-law in late 2023 after being unable to locate the Appellant. It is submitted that this was material both to the credibility assessment and to prospective risk.
The Respondent's Rule 24 response
9. The Respondent opposed the appeal.
9.1 In relation to Ground 1, the Respondent submits that paragraph 52 constituted an adequate consideration of expert evidence which was of limited assistance to the Judge as primary fact-finder. It is submitted that the report did not resolve the principal concerns identified by the Judge concerning the Appellant's service dates, his family circumstances, or the discrepancies appearing in his documentary evidence.
9.2 In relation to Ground 2, the Respondent relies upon Maheshwaran and submits that inconsistencies are a legitimate consideration in assessing credibility and that the weight to attach to them was for the Judge. The Respondent further submits that the explanation based upon interpretation difficulties was raised late and that the Judge was not required to expressly address every aspect of the evidence in her findings.
9.3 In relation to Ground 3, the Respondent submits that the grounds place undue weight upon the Judge's use of the word “implausible”. Relying upon Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464, it submits that the decision should not be subjected to narrow textual analysis. The Respondent maintains that paragraph 50 demonstrates that the Judge did engage with the documentary evidence and was not obliged to refer expressly to every document.
9.4 In relation to Ground 4, the Respondent submits that the Judge's comprehensive rejection of the Appellant's account at paragraphs 47, 53 and 54 necessarily encompassed the claimed killing of his father-in-law. Reliance is placed upon Budhathoki (reasons for decisions) [2014] UKUT 341 (IAC) and JK (Democratic Republic of Congo) [2007] EWCA Civ 831 to the effect that the Judge was not required to give separate reasons addressing every narrative component of the claim.
Upper Tribunal hearing
Appellant’s submissions
10. Mr Fazli relied upon all four grounds in his oral submissions.
11. In relation to Ground 1, he submitted that the Judge’s consideration of Professor Aguilar’s evidence was effectively confined to paragraph 52 and was inadequate. The Judge had concentrated upon the expert’s acknowledgement that he could not authenticate Afghan documents. That did not address the substance of his expertise or report. Mr Fazli referred to Professor Aguilar’s experience of Afghanistan and his evidence that, whilst unable to authenticate the documents, he could comment upon the context in which such documents would have been issued and used. Mr Fazli referred to paragraphs 75 onwards of the expert report. He submitted that Professor Aguilar addressed relevant country conditions, the Appellant’s police and military service, the plausibility of his account, and the potential effects of trauma, interpretation and cultural context upon apparent inconsistencies. At paragraph 84 the expert also expressed his view concerning the reliability of the documents and the asserted chronology.
12. Mr Fazli submitted that those matters could not properly be rejected simply because the Judge had already disbelieved the Appellant’s oral account. It was submitted that the sequence and substance of the reasoning therefore disclosed the error identified in Mibanga.
13. In relation to Ground 2, Mr Fazli submitted that the Judge had treated a relatively limited number of inconsistencies as effectively determinative of the Appellant’s credibility. The principal discrepancy concerned when the Appellant had joined the police and Afghan National Army. The Appellant had, however, provided an explanation involving interpretation difficulties. Although that explanation was recorded earlier in the decision at paragraph 33, it was not addressed when the Judge made her findings.
14. Mr Fazli also challenged paragraph 51. The fact that the Appellant’s wife and children obtained national identity cards was not necessarily inconsistent with them otherwise living in hiding. The Appellant had provided an explanation concerning the assistance of his Taliban relative, but the Judge had not adequately explained why this was rejected.
15. Under Ground 3, Mr Fazli submitted that the Judge’s description of the documents as “implausible” was problematic in light of HK v SSHD. It was submitted that the Judge did not sufficiently engage with the nature and content of the individual documents or consider them properly with the remaining evidence.
16. Finally, in relation to Ground 4, Mr Fazli referred to paragraph 8 of the Appellant’s witness statement. The Appellant claimed that, when the Taliban could not find him, they went to his father-in-law’s home in late 2023, dragged him from his home and killed him in the street, stating that this was a warning to the Appellant that he could not remain hidden indefinitely. Mr Fazli submitted that this was plainly material to the existence and continuation of Taliban interest in the Appellant. No finding had been made upon it.
Respondent’s submissions
17. Mr Sheikh relied upon the Rule 24 response and submitted that the decision disclosed no material error of law.
18. In respect of Ground 1, he submitted that the decision must be read as a whole. At paragraph 46 the Judge expressly stated that she had considered all the evidence. She considered the oral and written evidence, the documents and, at paragraph 52, the expert evidence before reaching her ultimate conclusions. Mr Sheikh submitted that there was consequently no Mibanga error merely because the Judge dealt with the expert report after considering other evidence.
19. He further submitted that the expert report was of limited assistance in resolving the principal credibility issues. Professor Aguilar accepted that he could not authenticate the documents. His observations concerning trauma, memory and the circumstances in Afghanistan did not provide an explanation for the particular inconsistencies identified concerning whether and when the Appellant served with the police and Afghan National Army.
20. Mr Sheikh submitted that, even if the treatment of the expert report were inadequate, any error was immaterial.
21. In relation to Ground 2, Mr Sheikh submitted that the inconsistencies identified at paragraphs 48 and 49 were substantial. They appeared in the Appellant’s screening interview, asylum claim documentation, substantive interview and witness statement and went directly to the claimed police and military service which formed the foundation of his protection claim. He submitted that the Judge was entitled to find those matters damaging to credibility. The findings were not based upon a single discrepancy but upon a series of matters considered between paragraphs 47 and 53.
22. It was submitted that Judge was entitled to take account of the asserted inconsistency between the Appellant’s evidence that his wife and children were in hiding and their acquisition of identity cards in November 2022. Her rejection of the explanation based upon the involvement of the Appellant’s Taliban relative was a finding properly open to her.
23. In relation to Ground 3, Mr Sheikh submitted that paragraph 50 should not be read as rejecting the documents merely because they appeared implausible. The Judge identified matters concerning their dates, the different names appearing upon them and the circumstances and timing of their production. She expressly referred to Tanveer Ahmed. Read fairly and as a whole, the Judge therefore properly considered the documentary evidence together with the oral evidence.
24. In relation to Ground 4, Mr Sheikh accepted that the Judge did not make an express finding upon whether the Appellant’s father-in-law had been killed by the Taliban. He submitted, however, that a judge was not required to make findings upon every aspect of the evidence. The Judge was aware of this aspect of the Appellant’s case and had given adequate reasons for rejecting the core claim that his police or military service had caused the Taliban to pursue him.
25. In response to my question as to the materiality of the alleged killing, Mr Sheikh submitted that rejection of the core account implicitly encompassed rejection of that evidence. The absence of a separate finding did not therefore render the overall credibility assessment unlawful.
Legal Framework
26. The Upper Tribunal's task is not to decide whether it would have reached the same factual conclusions as the First-tier Tribunal. The issue is whether the decision involved the making of an error of law material to the outcome. An appellate tribunal must exercise appropriate restraint before interfering with evaluative findings made by the primary fact-finder. A judgment must be read fairly and as a whole, rather than subjected to an unduly narrow textual analysis: Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464.
27. A judge is not required to address every item of evidence or every argument advanced by the parties. What is required is reasoning which enables the parties to understand why the material issues were resolved as they were: Budhathoki (reasons for decisions) [2014] UKUT 341 (IAC). Equally, the failure to engage with evidence which bears materially upon a central disputed issue may amount to an error of law.
28. Inconsistency is capable of bearing upon credibility. The case of Maheshwaran [2002] EWCA Civ 173 does not establish that inconsistencies may not be given substantial weight. What is made of discrepancies is principally a matter for the fact-finder in the individual case. The assessment must nevertheless engage, so far as material, with explanations advanced for relevant discrepancies.
29. Documentary evidence is not considered in isolation. The question under the approach in Tanveer Ahmed is whether, having considered the evidence in the round, the document can be relied upon. The Tribunal is not required to start from an assumption of either authenticity or falsity. In this case, the interaction between the documentary material and the Appellant's oral account was therefore material to the Judge's overall credibility assessment.
30. Expert evidence similarly forms part of the evidence to be assessed in the round. The fact-finder is not bound by an expert's opinion, particularly where it depends upon factual assumptions which the Tribunal does not accept. However, where the expert evidence is relevant to the evaluation of the credibility of those underlying facts, the Tribunal must avoid reaching an adverse credibility conclusion first and using that conclusion as the reason for disregarding otherwise relevant expert evidence. That is the substance of the Mibanga principle relied upon in Ground 1.
Analysis and Conclusions
Ground 1: Expert evidence
31. The Judge noted that Professor Aguilar was a social anthropologist, that the documents provided to him were PDFs and that he did not profess competence to verify the authenticity of Afghan documents. Those were legitimate matters to take into account. However, the Judge did not address the wider purpose for which his evidence was relied upon. Professor Aguilar addressed matters including the context in which such documents might have been issued and used, relevant country conditions, the plausibility of aspects of the Appellant’s account, and matters which might bear upon the assessment of apparent inconsistencies in that account.
32. Having made adverse credibility findings concerning the appellant, the Judge stated at paragraph 52:
“He has accepted the Appellant to be a witness of truth, and the documents are reliable. Given my findings I have detailed above, I am not persuaded by the conclusions given by Professor Aguilar.”
33. I conclude that this discloses the error identified in Mibanga. The expert evidence was capable of informing the assessment of the Appellant’s account. It therefore required consideration as part of the evidence from which the Judge reached their credibility findings. Instead, the reasoning at paragraph 52 demonstrates that the Judge had already reached adverse findings about the Appellant’s credibility and relied upon those findings as the basis for rejecting the expert evidence.
34. I accept Mr Sheikh’s submission that Professor Aguilar could not determine whether the Appellant was telling the truth, nor could he authenticate the documents. The Judge remained the ultimate finder of fact. I also accept that some of the observations in the report were general and did not themselves explain each discrepancy identified by the Judge. Those matters went to the weight to be attached to the report. However, they did not remove the requirement to consider relevant aspects of the expert evidence independently and as part of the evidence in the round before reaching conclusions on credibility.
35. I therefore find that the Judge erred in law in her approach to the expert evidence. I address materiality below.
Ground 2: inconsistencies and adequacy of reasons
36. I do not accept the Appellant’s submission that the Judge treated a single inconsistency, or a small number of peripheral inconsistencies, as determinative of credibility. Paragraphs 47 to 53 must be read together. The Judge identified the differences between the accounts provided at different stages of the asylum process, considered the documentary evidence, addressed the circumstances of the Appellant’s family and considered further differences in the evidence concerning his journey to the United Kingdom and the documents in his possession.
37. Having regard to Maheshwaran, the existence and significance of an inconsistency are matters which a fact-finder is entitled to take into account when assessing credibility. Nothing in the Judge’s reasoning demonstrates that inconsistency was improperly equated with dishonesty or applied as some freestanding test of credibility.
38. I also reject the submission that the Judge overlooked the Appellant’s explanation based upon interpretation difficulties. The Judge expressly recorded that evidence at paragraph 33. Reading the decision fairly and as a whole, I am satisfied that the explanation was in the Judge’s mind. The fact that she did not accept it, or did not repeat it at paragraphs 48 and 49, does not establish an error of law. A Judge is not required to repeat in the conclusions every part of the evidence which has previously been set out.
39. I do not conclude that there was any error in the Judge’s treatment at paragraph 51 of the evidence concerning the Appellant’s wife and children. The Judge identified the matters which she regarded as inconsistent and recorded the explanation advanced by the Appellant. It was for her to assess the weight to be attached to that explanation. Her conclusion was one which was open to her on the evidence.
40. There is therefore no material error of law in respect of Ground 2.
Ground 3: documentary evidence
41. I have carefully considered the Judge’s description at paragraph 50 of the documents relied upon by the Appellant as “self serving and implausible”. The use of the word “implausible” in the context of an asylum claim requires scrutiny.
42. In HK v SSHD [2006] EWCA Civ 1037 the Court of Appeal warned of the dangers of reliance upon inherent probability in asylum cases. Conduct or events which may appear unlikely when viewed from the perspective of ordinary experience in the United Kingdom may occur in countries affected by conflict, persecution or social and political conditions very different from those familiar to the decision-maker. A finding that evidence is implausible cannot therefore properly rest merely upon a judge’s subjective view of how people, officials or institutions would ordinarily be expected to behave.
43. Had the Judge simply characterised the Appellant’s documents as “implausible”, without identifying an evidential foundation for that conclusion, there would have been force in Ground 3. However, paragraph 50 does not, when read fairly and in the context of the decision as a whole, disclose that error. The Judge did not reject the documentary evidence solely because she considered it inherently unlikely. She identified matters arising from the evidence itself which she regarded as relevant to its reliability and weight. These included the timing of the production of the documents, differences in the names appearing upon them and matters concerning their dates when considered against the Appellant’s claimed chronology of service. Those were evidential matters which the Judge was entitled to consider. They did not depend upon assumptions about how events ought to have occurred in Afghanistan.
44. Further, the Judge expressly directed themselves to Tanveer Ahmed and considered the documents together with the Appellant’s oral and written evidence. The applicable question was not whether the documents could independently be proved to be authentic, but what weight, if any, could properly be placed upon them when the evidence was considered in the round. The Judge was entitled to undertake that assessment.
45. I therefore regard the use of the word “implausible” as unfortunate, because taken in isolation it might suggest the type of reasoning against which HK cautions. However, reading paragraph 50 in its context, I am satisfied that the Judge’s conclusion rested upon identified evidential considerations rather than an impermissible assessment of inherent probability.
46. The Judge was not required to make a separate finding upon every document relied upon by the Appellant. Her reasons were sufficient to explain the approach she took to the documentary evidence.
47. I am therefore not satisfied that Ground 3 identifies an error of law. The ground amounts to disagreement with the weight that the Judge was entitled to attach to the documentary evidence.
Ground 4: Appellant’s father-in-law
48. The Appellant’s evidence was that, after he had left Afghanistan, the Taliban were unable to find him and went to his father-in-law’s home in late 2023. He claimed that they dragged his father-in-law from his home, killed him publicly and stated that his death was a warning to the Appellant that he could not remain hidden.
49. I accept Mr Sheikh’s submission that a judge is not required to make findings upon every piece of evidence or every factual allegation advanced in an appeal. As explained in Budhathoki (reasons for decisions) [2014] UKUT 341 (IAC), it is unnecessary for a judge to rehearse every detail or resolve every evidential dispute. The obligation is to identify and resolve the key conflicts in the evidence and explain in clear and brief terms the reasons for the conclusions reached. However, I consider that this allegation was a central rather than peripheral part of the Appellant’s case. If established, the killing of the Appellant’s father-in-law in the circumstances alleged was capable of providing evidence that the Taliban maintained an adverse interest in the Appellant after he had left Afghanistan. It was therefore relevant both to the assessment of the Appellant’s credibility and to the assessment of future risk.
50. I do not accept that the Judge’s catch-all rejection of the Appellant’s account at paragraph 54 adequately explained and resolved that distinct factual issue by implication. The Judge was aware of this aspect of the Appellant’s evidence, but no finding was made as to whether the event occurred. Given its potential significance to the protection claim, Budhathoki required the Judge to resolve it and provide adequate reasons for doing so.
51. The failure to make a finding upon this central issue amounts to an error of law.
Materiality
52. I have considered the two errors both separately and cumulatively. Neither concerns a merely peripheral aspect of the Judge’s reasoning. The error under Ground 1 affected the process by which the Judge reached her overall credibility assessment. The expert evidence was capable of informing the assessment of aspects of the Appellant’s account and required consideration as part of the evidence in the round, rather than being rejected by reference to adverse credibility findings which had already been reached.
53. The error under Ground 4 concerned evidence which, if accepted, was capable of providing independent support for the Appellant’s case that the Taliban maintained an adverse interest in him after his departure from Afghanistan. No finding was made upon that evidence.
54. The Judge’s assessment of credibility was holistic. I cannot be satisfied that the same overall conclusion would inevitably have been reached had the expert evidence been approached without error and the material allegation concerning the Appellant’s father-in-law been expressly determined.
55. Taken together, the errors under Grounds 1 and 4 materially undermine the Judge’s overall assessment of credibility and risk. Therefore the decision consequently involved the making of a material error of law and must be set aside.
Disposal
56. I have considered whether any findings of fact can properly be preserved. The errors I have identified affect the overall assessment of the Appellant’s credibility and the evidential foundation upon which the question of future risk must be determined. In those circumstances, I do not consider it appropriate to preserve the adverse credibility findings.
57. The extent of the fact-finding which will be required is substantial. The Appellant’s account, the documentary evidence and the expert evidence will require assessment afresh and in the round. Findings will also be required concerning the alleged killing of the Appellant’s father-in-law and its relevance, if established, to continuing Taliban interest in the Appellant.
58. Having regard to the nature and extent of the fact-finding required, and to the Appellant’s entitlement to have those matters properly determined at first instance, I am satisfied that the appropriate course is to remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal for a de novo hearing before a Judge other than First-tier Tribunal Judge C Mather.
59. No findings of fact are preserved.
Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of a material error of law.
The decision is set aside in its entirety.
The appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a fresh hearing before a Judge other than First-tier Tribunal Judge C Mather.
No findings of fact are preserved.
The anonymity order continues.
Benjamin Burgher
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
30 October 2026