Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case Nos: UI-2026-004009
UI-2026-004011
First-tier Tribunal Nos:
HU/01921/2024
HU/01922/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 9th of October 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE SWANEY

Between

wafika yahya al awad (1)
hadi eyad abu kharoub
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

ENTRY CLEARANCE OFFICER
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms S Jegarajah, counsel
For the Respondent: Ms A Ahmed, senior presenting officer
Heard at Field House on 7 October 2026
DECISION AND REASONS
Background
1. The appellants appeal the decision of the First-tier Tribunal judge (the judge) promulgated on 3 June 2026, dismissing their appeals against the refusal of their human rights claims. The appellants sought entry clearance to join their sponsor in the United Kingdom pursuant to Appendix Family Reunion (Protection) (Appendix FR) of the Immigration Rules. The appellants are the mother and brother of the sponsor, who is a recognised refugee in the United Kingdom.
2. The respondent refused their applications in letters dated 23 September 2024. The respondent did not accept that the appellants satisfied the relationship requirements of Appendix FR because neither was a parent or a child of the sponsor. The respondent did not accept that the appellants had demonstrated the existence of family life between them and the sponsor and did not consider that there were exceptional or compelling circumstances warranting a grant of leave to remain outside the Immigration Rules. The respondent considered the best interests of the second appellant, who was a minor at the date of application, and found that they would be protected by remaining in the care of the first appellant.
3. The appellants appealed and their appeals were determined in a decision promulgated on 3 June 2026. The appellants accepted that they could not satisfy the relationship requirements of Appendix FR and therefore their appeal fell to be determined on human rights grounds pursuant to article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). In dismissing the appeals, the judge found:
(i) The relationships between the appellants and the sponsor do not contain the additional elements of dependency required and do not amount to family life for the purposes of article 8.
(ii) The public interest and the fact that the appellants fail to satisfy the Immigration Rules carry weight.
(iii) There is no evidence that the appellants speak English.
(iv) It is unlikely that the appellants will be financially independent.
(v) Life for the appellants in Syria is very difficult but there is no duty to protect them and there is no resettlement policy for Syrian nationals.
(vi) Article 8(1) is not engaged.
4. The appellants sought permission to appeal on two grounds: firstly, that the judge was wrong to conclude that family life did not exist between the appellants and the sponsor; and secondly, that the judge was irrational in stating that no evidence of medical care in Syria was before her but referring to the respondent’s Country Policy and Information Note: Humanitarian situation, Syria, July 2025 (the CPIN) which was relied on by the appellants.
5. Permission to appeal was refused on ground one on the basis that it was a mere disagreement with the judge’s finding and did not disclose an arguable error of law. Permission was granted in respect of ground two on the basis that it was not possible to reconcile the judge’s two statements and that the ground was therefore arguable.
6. The appeal came before me for determination as to whether the error of law is material. The appellant did not seek to renew ground one in respect of which permission to appeal was refused and my consideration is therefore limited to ground 2.
The law
7. Section 82 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (the 2002 Act) provides for a right of appeal where the Secretary of State has decided to refuse a human rights claim. Section 84 provides that the sole ground of appeal in a human rights claim is that the decision is unlawful under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 (public authority not to act contrary to the Human Rights Convention).
8. In Razgar v SSHD [2004] UKHL 27, the House of Lords set out a five stage test for considering the engagement and application of article 8 of the ECHR. It should not need explaining but the five questions that must be asked are:
(i) Will the proposed removal be an interference by a public authority with the exercise of the applicant's right to respect for his private or (as the case may be) family life?
(ii) If so, will such interference have consequences of such gravity as potentially to engage the operation of article 8?
(iii) If so, is such interference in accordance with the law?
(iv) If so, is such interference necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others?
(v) If so, is such interference proportionate to the legitimate public end sought to be achieved?
9. As the House of Lords indicated, if question (i) is answered in the negative, that is the end of the matter.
Discussion
10. At the outset of the hearing, I asked the parties to address me on how ground two could amount to a material error of law in a human rights appeal where the finding that article 8(1) is not engaged is not challenged. Ms Jegarajah submitted that goes to materiality. I indicated that I wanted to understand how it could go to materiality in circumstances where there is an undisturbed finding that article 8 is not engaged and because the ground of appeal challenging that finding had not been renewed. Ms Jegarajah submitted that it is material because had the error not been made, it is arguable that it would have had an impact on the overall assessment in the appeal.
11. I observed that this might be relevant to the engagement of article 8 but once again pointed out that that issue was not before me because of the undisturbed finding of the judge in respect of which permission was refused, and because no renewed application was made.
12. Ms Jegarajah submitted that ground one could not be renewed given the finding of a lack of dependency, but that if the error in relation to dependency had not been made, the appellant would be able to challenge the first finding. Ms Jegarajah stated that the appellants were unrepresented; that their first appeal had to be abandoned due to the inability of the judge to promulgate a decision resulting in it being reheard with the consequent delay; and that it had been difficult for the sponsor to secure legal representation for the appellants, which was why she had agreed to act for them pro bono. Ms Jegarajah then asked for an opportunity to file amended grounds with an adjournment. She accepted that the application was late, that the respondent would be likely to be prejudiced by it, and that she may be liable for any costs implications.
13. When I asked, Ms Jegarajah confirmed that she had represented the appellants in the First-tier Tribunal and also that she had drafted the grounds for permission to appeal.
14. Ms Ahmed was very measured in her response and noted that Ms Jegarajah was representing the appellants pro bono but disputed that they were unrepresented. Ms Ahmed submitted that there was no good reason for such a late application to renew the ground of appeal and that it would cause the respondent prejudice but accepted that the appeals were a matter of importance to the appellants.
15. I refused Ms Jegarajah’s application. The application was not made in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008. It should have been made no later than one month after the decision of the First-tier Tribunal refusing permission. The delay is significant and serious.
16. There was no reasonable explanation whatsoever for the fact that the application to renew ground one had not been made in time. None of the factors put forward by Ms Jegarajah are relevant to why the application could not have been made in time.
17. Had I not queried how ground two could be material in light of the refusal of ground one, I have no doubt that there would have been no application to renew the first ground of appeal at all. The appellants are not unrepresented; they are represented by Ms Jegarajah, experienced counsel, on a pro bono basis. The funding arrangements between Ms Jegarajah and the appellants are irrelevant for the purposes of considering compliance with relevant procedure rules. The Procedure Rules apply equally to all parties, whether represented or not and whether paying for their legal representation or not. I give significant weight to the need to ensure compliance with relevant Procedure Rules, practice directions and orders. Admitting an application to renew the ground of appeal would have caused prejudice to the respondent.
18. Taking into account all the circumstances known to me, I find that it is not necessary in the interests of justice to extend time for the appellants to make a renewed application for permission to appeal on ground one.
19. Having refused to extend time for a renewed application for permission to appeal on ground one, it follows that I find that any error disclosed in ground two is not material. The finding that there is no family life is not disturbed and accordingly article 8(1) of the ECHR is not engaged. That is where the appeal ends, as the respondent’s decision is not in breach of the ECHR and is therefore lawful under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998.
Notice of Decision
20. The decision of the judge does not contain a material error of law.
21. The appeals are dismissed.

J K Swaney

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

7 October 2026