UI-2026-004032
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The decision
IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-004032
First-tier Tribunal No:
PA/56662/2025
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Decision & Reasons Issued:
3rd November 2026
Before
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BLUM
Between
J L M
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms K Tobin, counsel, instructed by Tower Hamlets Law Centre
For the Respondent: Mr E Tufan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer
Heard at Field House on 22 October 2026
Order Regarding Anonymity
Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant and any member of her family is granted anonymity.
No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant and any member of her family. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.
DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant has been granted permission to appeal the decision of judge of the First-tier Tribunal (IAC) Peer (the judge) who, in a decision dated 26 May 2026, dismissed her appeal against the respondent’s decision dated 7 February 2025 to refuse her protection and human rights claim.
Background
2. The appellant is a national of Cameroon. She arrived in the UK on 26 March 2024 having been granted entry clearance as a visitor for 6 months. She claimed asylum on 29 October 2024. She claimed to fear being subjected to ill-treatment in Cameroon from both the Ambazonian rebel movement and the Cameroonian state security services.
3. The following is a summary of the asylum claim advanced by the appellant. As an engineer she was employed in respect of a road construction project. Around June 2023 the appellant was kidnapped by the Ambazonian movement, a group whose aim is to establish an independent state in the northwestern and southwestern region of Cameroon. The Ambazonian movement believed the appellant may have provided information to the authorities relating to them as she had been detained for 3 days by the authorities a couple of months earlier while working on a section of road and questioned about her knowledge of the whereabouts of the Ambazonian movement. A ransom demand made by the Ambazonian movement was eventually paid, some of this money being derived from a payment system utilising the appellant’s mobile phone, the rest provided by her family. The Cameroonian security services were not informed by the appellant’s family of the kidnapping or the ransom payment. Some months later the Cameroonian state security services became aware that money emanating from the appellant had been provided to the Ambazonian movement. The appellant was detained as she was believed to be a supporter of the Ambazonian movement. In September 2023 the appellant managed to escape with the support of a prison guard who considered the appellant to be innocent. A passport was obtained for the appellant and she then obtained entry clearance to the UK. She maintains that she will be the subject of an imputed political opinion by both the Ambazonian rebel movement and the state security services, each targeting her in the mistaken belief that she supports the other.
4. The respondent did not accept the appellant gave a credible account of events in Cameroon. The issues for the judge to determine were whether the appellant gave a credible account of events that she claimed caused her to leave Cameroon. The respondent accepted that if the appellant’s account was accepted as credible then she would be unable to access a sufficiency of protection and she would be unable to avail herself of the internal relocation alternative.
The judge’s decision
5. At [65] of her decision the judge stated:
“Having considered the whole of the evidence in the round, I find that the appellant has not discharged the burden of proof of having a well-founded fear of persecution for a Refugee Convention reason and have concluded that his [sic] removal would not cause the United Kingdom to be in breach of its obligations under the Refugee Convention or in relation to persons entitled to humanitarian protection.”
6. In the two sections prior to this conclusion, headed “Appellant’s account” and “Events in Cameroon”, the judge considered various elements of the appellant’s evidence and the issues raised by the respondent in respect of some of those elements. For example, the judge considered the adverse inferences drawn by the respondent under section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004 and concluded that these were properly drawn based on the appellant’s delay in claiming asylum ([33] & [34]). The judge found a lack of information from the appellant concerning the MRC (an opposition political party the appellant claimed to be a member of) undermined this aspect of her claim, although it was only a peripheral issue [38].
7. The judge recounted the principal events underlying the appellant’s claim ([40] to [42]) and then evaluated aspects of these events. At [44] to [46] the judge considered the appellant’s claim to have paid a portion of the ransom using a system involving her mobile phone. The judge accepted that there were payment systems as described by the appellant, but she found it “odd” that the appellant was unable to give a name to the system other than referring to the telephone providers, and the judge was “less convinced” that there could be no documentary evidence obtainable by the appellant to support this aspect of her claim. At [47] the judge declined to draw an adverse inference argued for by the respondent concerning the appellant’s account of mistreatment when detained by the Ambazonian movement. At [48] the judge found, on the one hand, that it was “somewhat odd” that the appellant had not reported her kidnapping to the police, especially given her previous contact with the police in April 2023. The judge then qualified her assessment by stating,
“That said, I acknowledge that the appellant would obviously wish to avoid any more contact with the Ambazonians given her awareness of their treatment of others even if she was released physically unscathed.”
8. The judge then identified her concern as to how the police would have become aware that the appellant had paid money to the Ambazonian movement and noted that the appellant’s family, who had paid a greater amount, had not been pursued [49]. From [50] to [53] the judge recounted the appellant’s escape from prison and her claim to have hidden in her father’s village for several months until she was able to leave Cameroon, and the issues raised by the respondent as to the credibility of this part of her account. Whilst acknowledging newspaper reports provided by the appellant of other individuals who had escaped from prison offered some “limited support” for the appellant’s account, the judge stated, at [53]:
“I am sceptical that the account is credible as to the appellant’s ability to escape and evade detection for the period of five months whilst moving to and from her father’s house in Douala and his village.”
9. Then at [54] the judge again said she was “sceptical” in respect of the appellant’s claim that she was unaware of the circumstances in which the arrangements were made for the issuance of her passport and her visa. The judge, whilst accepting that the author of an expert report provided on the appellant’s behalf was suitably qualified and that the judge could therefore place reliance and weight on the report, ultimately attached little weight to the expert’s analysis of a WhatsApp message containing a photograph of an arrest warrant and search warrant because the expert had not seen the actual documents and the appellant had been unable to give clear evidence as to the provenance of the WhatsApp message. Whilst the expert had concluded that the images of the documents he saw were consistent with authentic documents, the expert had not considered the documents themselves or undertaken any verification checks with the relevant authorities and the judge was not satisfied that the documents provided by the appellant were reliable ([55] – [60]).
10. At [61] the judge then considered an addendum report by the country expert who commented on the degree of corruption within Cameroon and that corruption and weak law enforcement was supportive of the appellant’s claim to have been able to obtain a passport and leave the country. At [62] the judge however concluded this aspect of the appellant’s claim “was not credible” having regard to the lack of detail provided by the appellant in respect of arrangements made to secure her exist and her need to have attended the passport issuing office and to obtain her entry clearance.
11. The appeal was dismissed.
The appeal to the Upper Tribunal
12. The appellant sought permission appeal on 5 grounds. Permission was granted by the FtT in respect of a single ground only. I replicate the decision granting limited permission below:
“The grounds challenge the Judge’s assessment of the appellant’s account on five bases. Permission is granted on Ground 2 only.
It is arguable that the Judge did not make sufficiently clear findings on the core factual account. The decision records the evidence and expresses scepticism about the claimed kidnapping, arrest, detention and escape, but arguably does not state with sufficient clarity which of those central events were accepted or rejected. That issue is material because the respondent had accepted that, if the appellant’s account were credible, the feared treatment would amount to persecution and neither sufficient protection nor internal relocation would be available.
Ground 1 does not disclose an arguable material error of law. The Judge identified the applicable statutory framework and the relevant standards of proof. The passages relied upon in the ground show that aspects of the evidence were considered capable of supporting the account, but did not compel acceptance of the account as a whole. The Articles 2 and 3 claims depended upon the same factual account.
Ground 3 is not arguable. The Judge gave adequate reasons for the weight attached to the expert and documentary evidence. The Judge was entitled to take account of the absence of original documents, the uncertain provenance, the limitations of a visual inspection, the absence of independent verification and the appellant’s limited knowledge of how the documents were obtained. The ground amounts to disagreement with the Judge’s evaluative assessment.
Ground 4 does not disclose arguable unfairness or inadequacy of reasons. The decision records that the appellant was questioned about obtaining the passport, attending for biometrics, the person said to have assisted her and her knowledge of the arrangements. The expert evidence showed that departure whilst subject to an arrest warrant was possible but did not establish the truth of the appellant’s particular account.
Ground 5 is not arguable. The appellant had relied upon membership of the MRC and had raised it at screening. It was open to the Judge to treat her limited knowledge as one factor in the overall assessment whilst recognising that the issue was peripheral. In any event, the Judge attached only limited weight to that matter and gave several independent reasons for the adverse conclusion.
Permission to appeal is granted on Ground 2 only and refused on Grounds 1, 3, 4 and 5. I have also considered whether there is any Robinson obvious error and am satisfied that there is none.”
Preliminary issue: late application to renew grounds of appeal in respect of which the FtT refused permission
13. The decision granting only limited permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal was dated 21 July 2026. The appellant’s solicitors would have been aware of this decision on 21 July 2026. In any event, the Upper Tribunal issued an acknowledgment of the grant of permission to the appellant’s solicitors on 31 July 2026. On 7 October 2026 the Upper Tribunal sent a Notice of Hearing to the appellant’s solicitors in respect of the ‘error of law’ hearing listed for 22 October 2026. On 9 October 2026 the appellant’s solicitors were informed by an email sent by the Upper Tribunal that they were due to provide an electronic composite bundle for the hearing on 22 October 2026 by 8 October 2026 but had failed to do so. The solicitors were informed that a bundle had to be provided by 12 October 2026. It was not until 15 October 2026 that a renewed application for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal was signed and dated by the appellant’s solicitors. I determined whether to extend time to allow the appellant to make her renewed application for permission to appeal having considered the submissions made by Ms Tobin and Mr Tufan.
14. Rule 21(3)(a) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 requires an application for permission to appeal to be made within 14 days of the date notice of refusal of permission was sent by the FtT. The same rule applies in respect of a limited grant of permission; if the appellant wishes to renew the application for permission in respect of the grounds refused by the FtT, they have to make the renewed application directly to the Upper Tribunal within 14 days of the date notice of refusal of permission was sent by the FtT. The renewed application for permission to appeal was dated 15 October 2026. It should have been received by the Upper Tribunal on 4 August 2026.
15. The Upper Tribunal has the power to extend time for complying with any rule, practice direction or direction, under rule 5(3)(a) of its case management powers. Rule 2 of the procedure rules indicates that their overriding objective is to enable the Upper Tribunal to deal with cases fairly and justly, and the Upper Tribunal must give effect to the overriding objective when it exercises any power under the procedure rules.
16. The Upper Tribunal has issued reported decision on the need to ensure procedural rigour (see, for example, Maleci (Non-admission of late evidence) [2024] UKUT 00028 (IAC) and Dawrani (Judicial discretion – late evidence – sanction) [2026] UKUT 00151 (IAC), and the Court of Appeal has emphasised the importance of procedural rigour: see, for example, Talpada, R (On the Application Of) v SSHD [2018] EWCA Civ 841.
17. Applying the 3-stage approach identified in R (Hysaj) v SSHD [2014] EWCA Civ 1633, SSHD v SS (Congo) [2015] EWCA Civ 387, Denton v. TH White Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 906, and SA (Non-compliance with rule 21(4)) Bangladesh [2022] UKUT 00132 (IAC), I am satisfied there has been a significant delay in making the renewed application for permission to appeal. 72 days has elapsed from the deadline for seeking permission to appeal. Ms Tobin did not suggest that the delay was anything other than significant.
18. The only explanation offered for the delay is contained in the form dated 15 October 2026 applying for permission to appeal the grounds upon which the FtT refused permission. This stated,
“Permission to appeal was granted on limited grounds, following a review by counsel which was only conducted after the deadline to appeal had passed, counsel advised that an out of time application should be made to appeal on all the other grounds as well.”
19. I indicated to Ms Tobin at the ‘error of law’ hearing that this was barely an explanation, let alone a good reason for the delay. The solicitors should have been aware of the deadline for lodging a renewed application for permission to appeal. Ms Tobin could offer no explanation for the significant delay.
20. The third stage is to evaluate all the circumstances of the case, so as to enable the Upper Tribunal to deal justly with the application. I take into account Ms Tobin’s submission that there was overlap between grounds 3 and 4 and ground 2, upon which permission was granted, a point acknowledged by Mr Tufan. Whilst grounds 2, 3 and 4 (Ms Tobin indicated at the hearing that she was not pursuing ground 5) relate to the judge’s approach to the appellant’s credibility, they are nevertheless distinct and independent grounds. Ground 3 contended that the judge gave legally insubstantial reasons for finding the arrest and search warrant were not reliable documents in light of the expert report, and ground 4 contended that the appellant was not pressed to provide details of her departure from Cameroon and the judge’s finding on this point was unsustainable. These are quite distinct from the essence of ground 2, which is that the judge failed to make any actual findings in respect of the core elements of the appellant’s account.
21. I take into account Ms Tobin’s submission that this is an asylum appeal and the need to exercise anxious scrutiny when the appellant’s life may be in danger, and that the Tribunal would still have an opportunity to determine the appeal if time were extended. I have also considered that the appellant does not appear to have been personally to blame for the delay. I additional note what is said in Hysaj that in most cases the merits of the appeal will have little to do with whether it is appropriate to grant an extension of time. Only in those cases where the Tribunal can see without much investigation that the grounds of appeal are either very strong or very weak will the merits have a significant part to play when it comes to balancing the various factors that have to be considered at stage three. Ms Tobin relied on the outstanding grounds as being very strong. I do not agree. In relation to the 1st ground the judge properly directed herself in respect of the appropriate standard of proof for determining Refugee Convention claims (by reference to the Nationality and Borders Act 2022) and appropriate authorities and reported decisions. The fact that the judge identified certain factors as being consistent with or supporting the appellant’s account of events is an indication of a measured assessment. There is nothing in the language used by the judge in her consideration of the appellant’s evidence that even arguably suggests she was applying a higher standard of proof. The judge also properly directed herself as to the lower standard of proof in respect of humanitarian protection grounds (the same as article 3) and there is nothing in the decision to suggest that this lower standard was not properly applied to the assessment of whether the appellant would be at risk of article 3 ECHR ill-treatment. The judge was unarguably entitled to place only limited weight on an expert’s analysis of an arrest warrant in circumstances where the expert had only been able to consider a photograph of the arrest warrant and the provenance of the WhatsApp message containing the photograph was unclear. The judge had considered the expert’s assessment in some detail, and she appropriately applied the Tanveer Ahmed * [2002] Imm AR 318 principles when assessing the reliability of the arrest warrant having paid due regard to the expert’s analysis. The judge was, furthermore, rationally entitled to assess that the appellant’s departure was not credible for the reasons she gave, which were supported by the evidence presented to the FtT.
22. Whilst I have considered all the points raised by Ms Tobin I find, having considered the circumstances of this case holistically, including the significance of the delay, the lack of good explanation and the underlying weakness in the grounds, and being mindful of the overriding objective and the need to ensure procedural rigour, that it is not appropriate to extend time.
Consideration of ground in respect of which permission to appeal was granted
23. The appellant contends that the judge, while concluding that the burden of proof had not been discharged overall, failed to make clear findings about several core aspects of the appellant’s claim. There was, by way of example, no clear finding as to whether the appellant was kidnapped by the Ambazonian movement. Whilst the judge identified elements of this particular aspect of the claim with which she had concerns (see paragraph 7 above), other elements of the appellant’s evidence were said to be consistent or plausible. The same issue arose in respect of the appellant’s claimed arrest and imprisonment by the Cameroon security services. An assertion by the judge that she was “sceptical that the account is credible” cannot be equated with a clear factual finding. It was argued by Ms Tobin that there were no clear findings in respect of the core elements of the appellant’s account and that the appellant was therefore left in doubt as to what elements had been accepted and what elements were rejected by the judge. It was possible, for example, for the appellant to have been kidnapped by the Ambazonian movement, but for subsequent matters to have been found incredible. This demonstrated a lack of clear findings. There was also said to be an inconsistency in the judge’s assessment at [61] and [62] in respect of the judge’s assessment of the plausibility of the appellant’s account of being able to leave Cameroon if she was wanted by the state security services.
24. Mr Tufan submitted that, reading the decision as a whole, it was apparent that the judge rejected the core elements of the appellant’s account, or that the judge was not persuaded that the appellant had proved to the appropriate standard that those aspects of her claim occurred. Mr Tufan submitted that, whilst the use of the word “sceptical” may the most appropriate term, it was tantamount to negative adverse credibility findings.
25. There is some merit in Ms Tobin’s submissions. I accept that the judge has not made explicit factual findings in respect of the appellant’s claimed detention first by the state security services in April 2023, then by the Ambazonian movement in June 2023, and finally by the state security services in September 2023. The judge should have given a clear indication of what elements of the appellant’s claim she accepted and what elements she rejected, or she should have identified those elements in respect of which she was unable to make a clear finding.
26. The judge however made it clear at 11(c) & (d) of her decision that, if the appellant’s account was accepted as credible, then she would not be afforded a sufficiency of protection and would be unable to avail herself of the internal relocation alternative. The judge engaged in a holistic assessment of the credibility of the appellant’s claim, and she identified concerns with several elements of the appellant’s account. This included the appellant’s delay in claiming asylum (the judge rejected the explanation provided by the appellant), the appellant’s lack of adequate detailed knowledge of the MRC political party, the absence of any independent evidential support in respect of the payments the appellant claimed were made using her telephone, the failure of the appellant to inform the authorities of her kidnap by the Ambazonian movement, the circumstances of the appellant’s claimed escape from prison, her ability to evade the authorities for 5 months having so escaped, and the appellant’s claimed lack of awareness of the circumstances in which she obtained both her passport and her entry clearance. Whilst I accept that the judge’s use of the word ‘sceptical’ does not expressly convey a rejection of a factual assertion made by the appellant (see, for example, paragraph 8 above), I am nevertheless satisfied that it does indicate that judge was not persuaded to the appropriate standard of proof that the appellant had made out that element of her claim. Reading the decision ‘in the round’ I am satisfied that it is sufficiently clear that the judge has either rejected the appellant’s account of being held to ransom by the Ambazonian movement and subsequently being arrested and imprisoned by the security services and then escaping, or the judge has not been persuaded to the relevant standard of proof that these events did occur.
27. I am not persuaded there is any inconsistency in the judge’s reasoning at [61] and [62]. At [61] the judge assesses the expert report and concludes that the report “… does provide support for the appellant’s account as externally consistent and not inherently implausible.” The judge therefore found that the expert report did provide some general support for the appellant’s claim given the existence of weak law enforcement and corruption. However, at [62] the judge then considers the appellant’s particular account, including her need to have left her village in order to attend the passport issuing office and to obtain her entry clearance to enter the UK, and the appellant’s claimed lack of awareness of the circumstances by which these arrangements had been made, a point in respect of which the judge had previously expressed concerns [54]. The judge then “concluded” at [62] that this aspect of the appellant’s account was not credible. There is no inconsistency. The judge identified at [61] evidence that was supportive of the appellant’s account, but then rejected this at [62] by reference to the appellant’s actual evidence.
28. Given the judge’s clear conclusion as to the appellant’s asylum claim (see paragraph 5 above), the natural and irresistible inference from the judge’s overall assessment is that she rejected the core elements of the appellant’s claim or was not persuaded that they did occur. Whilst it would have been preferable for the judge to make explicit factual findings, I do not accept that she failed to make appropriate findings.
Notice of Decision
The appeal is dismissed.
D. Blum
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
27 October 2026