Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-004045
UI-2026-004044
UI-2026-004042

First-tier Tribunal No:
PA/76068/2024
PA/76070/2024
PA/76072/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

19th October 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE DOYLE

Between

SJ
AU
MA
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellants: Mrs L Barton, counsel, instructed by Arshad & Co Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr A Mullen, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House, on 13 October 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.
No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. I make an anonymity direction because this appeal arises from the appellants’ protection claim.
2. The first appellant is the mother of the second and third appellants. The second and third appellants’ appeals depend on the first appellant’s appeal. These are appeals by all three Appellants against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Sleight, dated 01/06/2026, which dismissed the Appellants’ appeals on all grounds.
Background
3. The Appellants are citizens of Pakistan. They claimed asylum in the UK on 03/12/2023. The Respondent refused the Appellants’ applications on 30/10/2024.
The Judge’s Decision
4. The Appellants appealed to the First-tier Tribunal. On 01/06/2026 First-tier Tribunal Judge Sleight (“the Judge”) dismissed the Appellants’ appeals.
5. The Appellants lodged grounds of appeal, and, on 24/07/2026, First-tier Tribunal Judge Lawrence granted permission to appeal. He said
2. Ground 1 is arguable. It is unclear whether the tribunal accepted that the lead Applicant was vulnerable for the purpose of the assessment of credibility, and it is arguable that the tribunal could only rationally but failed to have regard to such vulnerability as a factor relevant to the assessment of credibility and that such errors were material given the reasons why the tribunal did not accept the Applicant’s credibility on material issues.
3. Ground 2 is arguable. It is arguable that the tribunal erred by failing to have regard to relevant contextual evidence in the assessment of credibility on material issues.
4. Ground 3 is arguable. It is arguable that there was procedural unfairness in the tribunal’s reliance on adverse points that were not put to the Applicants vulnerability There do appear to be arguable errors by the tribunal in its understanding of the Applicant’s evidence, having regard to her witness statement, or inadequacy of reasons for rejecting the identified aspects of that evidence.
5. Ground 4 is not arguable. The tribunal did not find the timing of the asylum claim was damaging to the Applicants’ credibility.
6. Ground 5 appears to stand or fall with grounds 1 to 3, so I grant permission on that ground also.
7. Permission is granted on grounds 1, 2, 3 and 5 only.
6. In a Rule 25 response, the appellants withdrew ground 5, so that these appeals proceed on grounds 1, 2, and 3 only.
The Hearing
7. (a) For the appellants, Mrs Barton moved the grounds of appeal. Mrs Barton said that the Judge accepted that the first appellant is a vulnerable witness but then failed to apply the Joint Presidential Guidance on Vulnerable Witnesses (Guidance note No 2 of 2010). Mrs Barton said that the Judge should have factored the first appellant's vulnerability (created by her the experience of trauma and her fragile mental health) into his assessment of credibility. Mrs Barton said that the Judge was wrong to assess the first appellant's credibility by taking account of inconsistency without considering whether those inconsistencies were created by the appellant's vulnerability.
(b) Moving to the second ground of appeal, Mrs Barton said that the Judge's credibility assessment is flawed because the Judge considered the credibility of the first appellant's evidence in isolation from the background material, instead of integrating the consistency found in the background materials with the credibility assessment. The respondent accepts that the appellant is a victim of domestic violence. The Judge found that the appellant suffered domestic violence both in Pakistan and in the UK. Mrs Barton said that the Judge failed to consider plausibility in the round and therefore fell into the error of law discussed in Mibanga [2005] EWCA Civ 367 and HK v SSHD [2006] EWCA Civ 1037.
(c) The third round of appeal relates to procedural fairness. Mrs Barton said that material matters were not put to the appellant but found their way into the Judge's decision. Mrs Barton said that the Judge acknowledges that key matters were not challenged but he relied on those key matters to make adverse credibility findings.
(d) Mrs Barton urged me to set the decision aside and to remit this case to the First-tier to be determined of new.
(e) For the respondent, Mr Mullen opposed the appeal. He said that the decision does not contain an error of law. Mr Mullen said that guidance about vulnerable witnesses was followed and that there is no requirement to assess the credibility of a vulnerable witness in a particular way. He said that there were discrepancies in the evidence which were not linked to vulnerability.
(f) Mr Mullen said that the question of continuing risk to a victim of domestic violence is set out in the respondent’s review and so was a matter for the appellants to deal with. He said that the Judge dealt with the first appellant's evidence about a criminal prosecution and that matters raised in the respondent’s review did not need to be put to the appellant. Mr Mullen said that the discrepancy in evidence arose in re-examination of the appellant by appellant's own counsel. There was therefore no procedural failing.
(g) Mr Mullen urged me to allow the decision to stand and to dismiss the appeal.
Analysis
8. The first ground of appeal relates to the way the Judge assessed the evidence. The joint presidential guidance directs the Judge to be aware of three things when there is an adult vulnerable witness
i. Some forms of disability cause or result in impaired memory;
ii. The order and manner in which evidence is given may be affected by mental, psychological or emotional trauma or disability;
iii. Comprehension of questioning may have been impaired.
9. Guidance Note 2 of 2010 gives guidance about the weight to be placed on factors of vulnerability, cautioning that allowances must be made for different degrees of understanding, and, where there are clear discrepancies in oral evidence, warning the Judge to consider the extent to which the vulnerability or sensitivity of the witness contributes to a discrepancy or lack of clarity. The guidance note finishes with this sentence
In asylum appeals, weight should be given to objective indications of risk rather than necessarily to a state of mind.
10. The question of vulnerability was raised as a preliminary issue. At [12] of the decision the Judge records that the first appellant was treated as vulnerable, and only modest adjustments were requested.
11. Between [36] and [37] of the decision the Judge finds significant inconsistencies in the first appellant's evidence. The Judge explains in detail why he finds those inconsistencies. At [37] the Judge records that in re-examination the first appellant changed her evidence about a crucial part of her claim.
12. SB (vulnerable adult: credibility) Ghana [2019] UKUT 398 (IAC) gives this guidance:
The fact that a judicial fact-finder decides to treat an appellant or witness as a vulnerable adult does not mean that any adverse credibility finding in respect of that person is thereby to be regarded as inherently problematic and thus open to challenge on appeal.
13. There is no merit in the first ground of appeal. The first appellant’s vulnerability was clearly in the Judge's mind (He looks for medical evidence to explain omissions in her evidence at [55]). The Judge gives adequate reasons for finding that the first appellant gave inconsistent and unreliable evidence.
14. The starting point for the second ground of appeal is that the respondent accepts that the appellant is a victim of domestic violence. Between [33] and [36] the Judge carefully considered the extent of that concession, and he reinforces the respondent's concession. At that point the case became about the power and influence of the first appellant’s husband and his family, and their enduring desire to harm the appellants. Did the Judge need to discuss the background materials in detail?
15. At [41] of the decision, the Judge finds that the appellants have not been threatened since 2023. Between [37] and [48] the Judge grapples with the evidence of the power and influence of the first appellant’s in-laws. His conclusion, at [49], is that there is no continuing threat from the first appellant's abusive husband's family. The Judge does not need to discuss background materials to reach that conclusion. The Judge clearly had in mind the plight of victims of domestic violence in Pakistan, but found that the appellants do not face a risk of persecution because the first appellant’s in-laws have lost interest in her.
16. The Judge found that there was no reliable evidence of either power, or influence, or continuing interest.
17. The detail of the third ground of appeal is
The Judge relied on matters or adverse points not put to the First Appellant in cross examination, including:

• the ease with which AU was brought to the UK,
• the absence of threats after 2023,
• the plausibility of the husband’s family’s influence.

The Judge acknowledged that key matters were not challenged in cross examination but still relied on them adversely.
18. At [8] of the decision the Judge summarises the respondent's position, and at [17] of the decision the Judge identifies the relevant issues raised in the appeal. In MR (Pakistan) 2026 EWCA civ 473 it was held that Tribunals must still assess all of the evidence, even where the core issue is not challenged in cross-examination
19. At 40 of the decision the Judge says
There was no evidence that during that six-month period the threats had been carried out against SJ's family. If the family of SJ's husband were as inflamed by her making a report to the police as asserted, there is no obvious reason why such threats did not materialise.
20. What the Judge says at [40] relates to sufficiency of evidence. It is not a matter which needs to be put in cross examination. What the Judge is saying is that the appellant has not produced evidence to support a crucial part of her claim. If the evidence is not there then the Judge cannot make the finding of fact the appellants crave. The Judge said there was a lack of evidence on a crucial matter pled by the appellants.
21. The Judge considered the ease with which a child was brought to the UK between [42] and [45]. There was no procedural irregularity. What the Judge has done is consider each strand of the appellants’ evidence and then found that there are gaps which cause fatal flaws in the evidence.
22. A fair reading of the decision does not demonstrate that the first appellant was deprived of the opportunity to comment on determinative matters. The determinative matters were covered in the first appellant's witness statement and transcripts of interview. It would have been wrong for the Judge to ignore the contents of those strands of evidence.
23. The Judge found that the first appellant gave inconsistent evidence and that the appellants failed to produce sufficient evidence to prove the core aspects of their claim. There was no unfairness in the procedure adopted.
24. The decision does not contain a material error of law. The Judge’s decision stands.
DECISION
The appeal is dismissed. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal dated 1 June 2026 stands.

Signed Paul Doyle Date 17 October 2026
Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Doyle