Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-004275
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/56849/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 23rd of October 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE GREER

Between

OL
(Anonymity direction continued)
Appellants
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Rana, Solicitor
For the Respondent: Mr Simpson, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard on 12 October 2026

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant appeals with permission a decision of the First-tier Tribunal (‘the Judge’), signed on 2 June 2026 following a hearing by CVP on 1 June 2026, in which the Judge dismissed her appeal against the refusal of her protection and human rights claim.
2. The Appellant is a citizen of Nigeria, born in Lagos in 1992. It is her case that she was sexually abused by her father from early childhood and raped by him at the age of ten. She says that her father threatened to kill her if she disclosed the abuse, and that when she attempted to report him to the police, she was not believed. In 2012 she disclosed the abuse to her older brother, a soldier, who confronted their father and threatened to expose him. She then lived under her brother’s protection until his death on 29 January 2021. She came to the United Kingdom on a visit visa on 27 July 2021 and claimed asylum on 17 July 2024. She fears that, without her brother’s protection, her father will kill her if she returns to Nigeria.
3. In a decision dated 10 February 2025, the Respondent refused the claim. The Respondent accepted the Appellant’s nationality and that her father had been abusive to her. The Respondent did not accept that her father is an influential man, and considered that there would be a sufficiency of protection in Nigeria and that the Appellant could relocate to Lagos or Abuja.
4. The Judge accepted that the Appellant had been raped by her father as a child and had lived under her brother’s protection from 2012 until his death in 2021 ([11(a)] – [11(b)]). At [11(e)] – [11(i)], he found that there was no reliable evidence of the father’s claimed power and influence. At [11(j)] – [11(m)], he found that there was a sufficiency of protection, that the Appellant could again live separately from her father, and that there was no risk on return. At [17] – [18], he found that there were no obstacles to her integration in Nigeria. He dismissed the appeal on all grounds.
5. Permission to appeal was granted by another Judge of the First-tier Tribunal on 3 August 2026, on all grounds. The operative part of the grant is in the following terms:
In my judgement it is arguable that the Judge failed to take into consideration relevant evidence in assessing risk on return, sufficiency of protection and internal relocation.
I conclude that it is arguable that there are material errors of law in the decision. I grant permission to appeal on all grounds
6. The Respondent filed a response under rule 24 dated 25 August 2026, opposing the appeal. The Appellant filed a reply under rule 25 dated 9 September 2026.
The Hearing
7. The matter came before me for an error of law hearing at Field House. Mr Rana appeared for the Appellant. At the outset, he confirmed that the Appellant no longer pursues the limb of Ground 4 which alleges a failure to treat her as a vulnerable adult. Mr Simpson opposed the appeal. I am grateful to both advocates for their assistance.
Discussion and analysis
8. I have kept in mind the guidance in Volpi and another v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464. In short, it is a well-established principle of law that there is a need to show restraint when addressing findings of fact made by a specialist fact-finding tribunal.
Ground 1: Future risk
9. For the reasons that follow, I find that Ground 1 is made out.
10. At [11(e)] – [11(i)], the Judge records that the Appellant “rationalises her fear by saying that her father is a powerful and influential political figure, but there is no reliable evidence that her father is either politically connected or powerful and influential”. He describes her account as vague and lacking in detail, refers to the “dearth of evidence” about her father, and notes that she was on notice from February 2025 that his status was disputed. At [11(k)], he says that “there is no reliable evidence that the appellant’s father is anything more than a Nigerian citizen with a history of sexual offending”.
11. The difficulty is that it is not clear what finding the Judge has made about the father’s influence. These paragraphs record deficiencies in the evidence. They do not say whether the Judge found that the father has no influence of any kind, or only that his claimed national political influence was not made out, nor to what standard he made that assessment. It is doubtful whether they amount to a finding at all. The point matters. The Respondent herself had accepted that the father’s connections might extend to “rogue-state actors at the very most” (Reasons for Refusal Letter, paragraphs 10, 14 and 21). The Appellant’s evidence was that the local police knew her father well and refused to record her complaint once his name was mentioned (AIR Q54, Q79). The informed reader cannot tell whether the Judge rejected that evidence, or why.
12. Nor did the risk on return depend on national political influence alone. The Appellant’s case was that her father had a motive to silence her, and that the absence of contact after 2012 was explained by her brother’s protection, which ended with his death. The Judge recorded that protective arrangement at [11(b)] but did not engage with it as the explanation for the absence of contact on which he placed weight. Nor did he resolve the Appellant’s evidence of threats to kill her if she disclosed the abuse, and of the injuries she says her father inflicted on her when she was a child.
13. Mr Simpson argued that the Judge set out the correct standard of proof, and that he was entitled to place significant weight on the absence of contact and on the absence of any evidence of the father’s presence or influence. He argued that the extent of the reasoning required correlates with the extent of the evidence, that the findings on risk were reasoned, and that it was clear to the Appellant why she had lost. He relied in particular on the absence of contact in the five years since the protective factor fell away.
14. I accept that the reasons a Judge must give are proportionate to the evidence and the issues. But the difficulty here is not the brevity of the reasoning. It is that the reasoning does not disclose what finding was made on the central factual question, and does not grapple with the Appellant’s explanation for the absence of contact. As for the five years since the protective factor fell away, the Appellant left Nigeria in July 2021, some six months after her brother’s death. She has been in the United Kingdom ever since. The absence of contact during that period says little about her father’s continuing interest in her. In any event, the Judge did not reason in that way, and it is not for me to reconstruct his reasoning.
15. In my judgment, it is not tolerably clear what the Judge found about the father’s influence, nor why the accepted history of abuse, the removal of the brother’s protection and the Appellant’s account of threats did not give rise to a reasonable likelihood of serious harm. The decision does not entitle the Appellant to understand why she lost on the question of risk.
16. Ground 1 is made out.
Ground 2: Sufficiency of protection
17. The Judge’s finding at [11(m)] that, even if there were a risk, there would be a sufficiency of protection is made in the alternative. It follows that, unless this finding is also flawed, the error under Ground 1 would not be material. For the reasons that follow, I find that Ground 2 is made out.
18. At [11(j)], the Judge relied upon the Respondent’s Country Policy and Information Note, Nigeria: Actors of protection (August 2024) as disclosing a functioning police force and criminal justice system, an increasing awareness of gender-based violence, and increased protections for victims of sexual and domestic violence since 2015. At [11(k)], he concluded that “there is no reliable evidence that the appellant’s father is anything more than a Nigerian citizen with a history of sexual offending” and that Nigeria provides a sufficiency of protection against him.
19. Mr Rana accepted that, on the Appellant’s own case, the police’s failure to act on her report in 2002 was attributed to her father’s influence (witness statement, paragraph 27). I do not regard that as determinative. Even if that was the reason for the failure of protection then, the Judge was still required to consider whether protection would in practice be available to this Appellant now: a single woman, the survivor of childhood sexual abuse by the man she fears, returning without the family support on which she had previously depended. The decision contains no such individualised assessment.
20. Moreover, the conclusion at [11(k)] rests upon the Judge’s assessment of the father’s influence. For the reasons I have given under Ground 1, that assessment cannot safely stand, and the protection finding falls with it.
21. Further, the Judge made no reference to passages of the CPIN to which Mr Rana took me, at 2.1.2, 2.1.3, 2.1.7, 2.1.13, 3.5.8, 5.2.31 and 5.2.32. Those passages bore directly on whether protection would be available to the Appellant in practice. The greater the apparent cogency and relevance of a particular piece of evidence, the greater the need for a judicial fact-finder to show that they have had due regard to it.
Ground 3: Internal relocation
22. Internal relocation was identified as an issue in dispute at [7(b)]. The only reasoning on it is at [11(l)]: “The appellant separated herself from her father in 2012. Return to Nigeria does not mean that the appellant returns to her father. The appellant can, once again, live separately from her father and be protected by the Nigerian police and criminal justice system.” For the reasons that follow, I find that Ground 3 is made out on the basis that the Judge gave inadequate reasons.
23. First, it is not clear where the Judge considered the Appellant could relocate. The Respondent proposed Lagos or Abuja (Reasons for Refusal Letter, paragraphs 25 – 33; Composite Bundle, Page 110). The Judge identifies neither, and makes no finding that either would be safe or reasonable. That omission matters. Lagos is the city in which the Appellant grew up, in which her father lives, and in which she says she suffered at his hands. If the Judge had Lagos in mind, the decision does not explain how relocation within that city would protect her from him. If he had Abuja in mind, the decision does not say so, still less assess the Appellant’s likely circumstances there.
24. Secondly, the Judge made no reference to the Appellant’s personal characteristics. The assessment of whether relocation would be reasonable, or unduly harsh, requires consideration of all relevant circumstances, including the claimant’s age, gender, health and family support. The Appellant is a single woman with a limp, a diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder and a history of suicide attempts, and no family to whom she can turn (Composite Bundle, Pages 43 – 44 and 86). None of this is mentioned.
25. In the rule 24 response, Mr Tan argued that the Appellant had relocated to live with her brother in 2012 without subsequent issue, and that she had experienced no problems in the six months between his death and her departure. In substance, the argument is that she has done it before, so she can do it again. The difficulty with that submission is that she relocated before with the substantial help and protection of her brother, who was a soldier and who had confronted and threatened to expose their father. That protection has gone. The Judge did not address whether she could relocate safely and reasonably without it. Ground 3 is made out.
Ground 4: Very significant obstacles and Article 8
26. As I have noted, Mr Rana did not pursue the vulnerable witness limb of this ground. He pursued the remaining limb, which challenges the Judge’s conclusion that there would be no obstacles to the Appellant’s integration in Nigeria. For the reasons that follow, I find that it is made out.
27. At [17] – [18], the Judge found that there were “no significant obstacles to integration” because the Appellant speaks the language of Nigeria, spent the first 29 years of her life there and has been in the United Kingdom for only five years, and because she is “an intelligent, gifted, person”. Each of those is a relevant consideration. But the assessment of whether an individual will be enough of an insider to participate in life in the country of return is a broad evaluative judgment, in which matters such as health and robustness of character may be of significance.
28. It is not tolerably clear that the Judge took into account all of the relevant considerations, including the Appellant’s physical disability, the trauma arising from the abuse she suffered, and her gender as a single woman without family support. The Judge acknowledged at [15] that the Appellant has physical and mental health conditions, but he considered them only in the context of Article 3. They play no part in the reasoning at [17] – [18].
29. Mr Simpson argued that the Appellant’s skeleton argument before the First-tier Tribunal did not advance specific arguments on these matters, and that the Judge met the arguments that were advanced. I reject that submission. The skeleton argument relied on the Appellant’s medical history, her limp and her depression (Appellant’s Skeleton Argument, paragraphs 20 – 21), as did her witness statement (paragraphs 30 – 32). The Respondent’s own decision addressed her limp, depression, trauma, insomnia and suicidal thoughts as potential obstacles to integration (Composite Bundle, Page 58). These matters were squarely before the Judge, whatever the shortcomings of the skeleton argument, and he was required to engage with them. Ground 4 is made out.
Disposal
30. I am conscious of the Court of Appeal’s decision in AEB v SSHD [2022] EWCA Civ 1512, Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 46 (IAC) and 7.2 of the Senior President’s Practice Statements. Sub-paragraph (a) deals with where the effect of the error has been to deprive a party before the Tribunal of a fair hearing or other opportunity for that party’s case to be put to and considered by the First-tier Tribunal, whereas sub-paragraph (b) directs me to consider whether I am satisfied that the nature or extent of any judicial fact finding which is necessary in order for the decision in the appeal to be re-made is such that, having regard to the overriding objective in rule 2, it is appropriate to remit the case to the First-tier Tribunal.
31. The errors I have identified go to the assessment of risk on return, sufficiency of protection, internal relocation and the Appellant’s integration in Nigeria. Fresh findings will be required on each of those issues, including on the father’s influence and on the Appellant’s account of threats and of the circumstances in which her brother protected her. The nature and extent of the judicial fact-finding required is such that it is appropriate for the appeal to be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal. The findings of fact at [11(a)] – [11(d)] were not the subject of dispute and are not infected by the errors I have identified. They are preserved. All other findings of fact are set aside.
Notice of Decision
1. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of a material error on a point of law. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal is set aside.
2. The findings of fact at [11(a)] – [11(d)] of the First-tier Tribunal’s decision are preserved. All other findings of fact are set aside.
3. The appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal to be heard afresh by a judge other than Judge of the First-tier Tribunal Doyle.

J. Greer

Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Greer

21 October 2026