UI-2026-004300
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The decision
IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-004300
First-tier Tribunal No (PA/01544/2025)
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Decision & Reasons Issued:
19th October 2026
Before
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BEACH
Between
HE
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Ball, Counsel instructed by Duncan Lewis Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms Keerthy, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer
Heard at Field House on 8 October 2026
Order Regarding Anonymity
Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant and/or any member of his family is granted anonymity.
No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant and/or any member of his family. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.
DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant appeals, with permission, against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal, promulgated on 2nd July 2025, dismissing the appellant’s appeal against a decision of the Secretary of State made on 4th November 2024, refusing his protection and human rights application.
Background to the appeal
2. HE is an Egyptian national who arrived in the UK on 26th April 2023 and who claimed asylum on the same day.
3. The appellant states that his family were involved in the Muslim Brotherhood and that he was arrested and tortured by the Egyptian authorities. He states that his father and two older brothers left the family home as a result of being accused of being involved with the Muslim Brotherhood. He states that between 2013 and 2019, the Egyptian authorities would visit the house looking for his father and brothers. The appellant states that, on 14th February 2019, the authorities came to the house again. He states that they slapped his mother and he defended her and was arrested by them. He states that he was interrogated, ill-treated and made to sign a blank paper before being released. The appellant states that following this, he left Egypt and travelled to Libya where he was forced to undertake heavy labour. He states that he eventually made his way to Europe and then to the UK. The appellant states that he has one brother in the UK with status, one brother with refugee status and one other brother who is under the care of social services.
The First-tier Tribunal decision
4. The Tribunal dismissed the appeal. The Judge noted that the appellant had provided the appeal decision of his brother and that his account was very similar to the appellant’s account which could indicate that it was a plausible account or could indicate that the appellant had copied his brother’s successful account. The Judge found that there were inconsistencies in the appellant’s evidence. The Judge did not accept that the appellant was arrested and detained because of family involvement with the Muslim Brotherhood. He found that taken at its highest, the appellant had slapped a police officer and was arrested and detained as a result of this. The Judge did not accept that the appellant had been interrogated and tortured. The Judge considered the expert report but found that it did not comment on the availability of treatment in Egypt and that forced labour in Libya would have affected the appellant’s mental and physical health. The Judge further found that any suicide risk could be mitigated. He further found that the appellant could reintegrate into Egypt.
The appeal to the Upper Tribunal
5. On 30th July 2026, the First-tier Tribunal granted permission to appeal on all grounds. The Tribunal found that it was arguable that the Judge had failed to consider the risk in light of the factual matrix accepted in the brother’s appeal decision, that it was arguable that the Judge relied on issues which were not central to the core of the claim and that it was arguable that the Judge did not properly assess the medical evidence.
The grounds of appeal
Ground 1
6. The appellant submitted that the Judge’s approach to the brother’s appeal was irrational. He submitted that the Judge failed to take full account of the basis of the brother’s claim which referred to suspicion arising as a result of a relative who was known to be a member of the Muslim Brotherhood. The appellant further submitted that the Judge failed to give proper consideration to the brother’s appeal decision or to assess the risk to the appellant in light of the findings in the brother’s decision.
Ground 2
7. The appellant submitted that the Judge placed too much reliance on inconsistencies in the appellant’s account. He submitted that the appellant’s account was in line with the background evidence and the appellant’s brother’s appeal decision. The appellant further submitted that the Judge relied on minor inconsistencies as undermining the appellant’s account.
Ground 3
8. The appellant submitted that the Judge made factual errors in the consideration of the medical evidence. He submitted that the Judge failed to identify that the expert considered the scars in light of the appellant’s account of what he stated had happened in Egypt and in Libya. The appellant further submitted that the Judge gave no reasons for rejecting the expert’s conclusions.
The Rule 24 response
9. The respondent did not file a Rule 24 response.
The hearing
10. The parties agreed that there was a material error of law.
Error of law decision
11. The parties both agreed that there was a material error of law in the Judge’s decision. Ms Keerthy, on behalf of the respondent, stated that the respondent accepted that the grounds, taken cumulatively, were enough to show that the credibility assessment was erroneous.
12. The Judge makes reference to the brother’s decision [16]. Whilst the Judge refers to the appellant’s account being similar to that of his brother and to that potentially being corroborative of the appellant’s claim or alternatively being suggestive that the appellant had copied a successful account, he does not address the decision any further. The brother’s decision contained findings of fact regarding the risk to the appellant’s brother in Egypt yet the Judge makes no reference to these in the appellant’s decision and does not assess the appellant’s claim in light of those findings of fact. There is no finding about whether the findings in the brother’s appeal would lead to a risk to the appellant or if the Judge found that they did not amount to a risk to the appellant, there are no reasons given for that finding.
13. The Judge also considered the expert report [19, 20]. In that consideration, the Judge notes that the expert found that the appellant’s scars were highly consistent with the claimed cause. The Judge goes on to find that the appellant’s forced labour in Libya and journey to the UK would have caused detriment to the appellant’s mental and physical health. However, the Judge does not give clear reasons for rejecting the conclusions in the expert report regarding the scarring. The expert found that the appellant’s presentation of scarring was highly consistent with the physical assaults which he states occurred in Egypt and Libya. The Judge notes this in his decision but does not clearly state why he places no weight on these findings other than to state that the journey to the UK and the appellant’s forced treatment in Libya would have had an effect on the appellant’s physical and mental health. The Judge does not go so far as to state that he finds that the scars were caused only by the treatment the appellant received in Libya but that is the implication. In making that finding, the Judge does not give reasons as to why he rejects the expert’s analysis that some of the scars are highly consistent with the appellant’s account of what he stated happened in Egypt.
14. The Judge relies on inconsistencies in the appellant’s account. Those inconsistencies primarily related to the age when the appellant stated his father left the family home and he took over running the family business and to the appellant’s account of the outcome of his asylum claim in Italy. Inconsistencies can, of course, be indicative of an account which is not a credible account. However, the inconsistencies relied on by the Judge are essentially peripheral to the appellant’s account. Were it not for the other errors of law, I would not find that the findings regarding the inconsistences, in themselves, were sufficient to show that there had been a material error of law but taken cumulatively with the other errors of law, I find that they do adversely affect the credibility assessment to some extent.
15. For the reasons given above, I conclude that the First-tier Tribunal decision did involve the making of an error of law. I have considered whether the appeal should be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal to be heard afresh and have decided that, as there is a need for a full credibility assessment, it is appropriate to remit the hearing to be reheard by the First-tier Tribunal.
Notice of decision
1. The First-tier Tribunal decision did involve the making of an error of law
2. I remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal to be heard by a different judge. For the avoidance of doubt, none of the findings of fact are preserved.
F Beach
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
19th October 2026