Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000613
UI-2026-000614
UI-2026-000612
UI-2026-000611

First-tier Tribunal No: HU/54176/2024
HU/54179/2024
HU/54185/2024
HU/54181/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

18th August 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE KIRK

Between

MK
AS
PK
KK
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellants
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellants: E. Waheed, instructed by Eagles Solicitors
For the Respondent: K. Khan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 29 May 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellants are granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellants, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellants. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellants appeal against the decision of a Judge of the First-tier Tribunal (‘Judge’) who, in a decision promulgated on 24 November 2025 (‘2025 Decision’), dismissed their appeal against the Respondent’s decision to refuse their human rights claims.
2. Permission to appeal was refused by the First-tier Tribunal on 3 February 2026.
3. On 31 March 2026, the Upper Tribunal granted the Appellants permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal (‘PTA Decision’).
Anonymity
4. I consider that it is appropriate to maintain the anonymity order made by the First-tier Tribunal. No party asked for it to be set aside.
Background
5. The Appellants are Indian citizens. The First Appellant and the Second Appellant are unmarried partners. The Third Appellant was born to the couple in the UK on 6 January 2021 and is currently 5 ½ years old. The Fourth Appellant was born in the UK on 22 March 2022 and is four years old. Both children have spent their entire life in the UK.
6. The First Appellant arrived in the United Kingdom (‘UK’) on 8 December 2010 at the age of 27, with entry clearance as a student, valid until 25 February 2012. The Second Appellant arrived in the UK on 25 October 2009 at the age of 23, with entry clearance as a student, valid until 31 October 2010. Both the First and Second Appellants overstayed their grant of leave to remain and have not departed the UK.
7. The First Appellant claimed asylum on 23 February 2015. Her asylum claim was refused by the Respondent on 9 March 2018. She appealed against the refusal of her asylum claim to the First-tier Tribunal. In a decision dated 27 June 2018, the Judge dismissed the appeal (‘2018 Decision’). The First Appellant exhausted her appeal rights with effect from 14 November 2018.
8. The Second Appellant was served with notices of removal on 6 September 2017 and 16 January 2018. On 18 January 2018, he claimed asylum. This was refused, and certified as clearly unfounded, on 9 March 2018. On 29 March 2018, the Second Appellant applied for stateless leave consideration, but this was refused on 7 January 2020.
9. On 17 July 2020, the First Appellant made further submissions to the Respondent with the Second Appellant as her dependant. On 14 January 2022, these were rejected under paragraph 353 of the Immigration Rules.
10. On 22 July 2022, the Appellants applied for leave to remain in the United Kingdom (‘UK’) on private life grounds. The Respondent refused their applications on 3 April 2024.
11. The Appellants appealed against the Respondent’s decisions.
2018 Decision
12. In the 2018 Decision, the Judge set out the following relevant findings of fact in relation to the First Appellant at [1]-[6]:
“The appellant is a female Indian citizen born in 1983 who entered the United Kingdom as a Tier 4 student pursuant to a visa on 23 September 2010 - the actual entry date being 8 December 2010 - the visa expiring 25th of February 2012. The appellant was accompanied by her husband [RS] as her dependent. Although this appears to be the Home Office record and what has been contended by the appellant throughout for reasons that I find impossible to follow the respondent did not accept that her husband was [RS] or that a marriage had occurred. No attempt has been made by the respondent to lodge any evidence relating to the grant (sic) the original visa or detailed application form that would have accompanied it.
The appellant's case in summary she set out in her 1st statement in December 2014 was that her husband [RS] was from a different cast (sic) to herself she had been lower cast (sic). She told her strict family that she was to continue her studies and in particular a degree in not (sic) the fact the marriage or the fact she was leaving India to come to United Kingdom. On arrival however at Heathrow and it appears logically after clearing immigration, [RS] had explained to her that he had used her to gain entry into the UK and would now be leaving her. That remains the position with her not having any contact with her family since. She stated then “I feel I cannot return to India and have no one to return to I will be heavily criticised and ostracised for having run away from my family home. Returning to India following a failed marriage this would be deeply frowned upon”.
[The appellant’s] personal attributes added to difficulties (sic) she is disabled following polio diabetic and also suffering depression. She stated she was scared for her safety. Return to India and the treatment she would face at the hands of the family members of the community. After substantive interview in June 2015 the appellant’s application for asylum was refused. It appears the respondent’s decision was certified but after complex procedural history a consent order was lodged in the High Court on 18 January 2017 whereby the original decision was withdrawn with a view to be reconsidered. The subject matter to this appeal is the respondent’s decision of 9th of March 2018.
At the hearing as well as oral evidence from the appellant, [RK] was called. Her evidence was that back in 2010 she was contacted by a friend (relative of the appellant's husband) who told her that he was collecting [the appellant] from the airport as she had been abandoned asking [RK] to accommodate her for a few nights. She agreed to do so. She described the first time she met the appellant and described her as being in distraught and hysterical state, heartbroken and scared. She set out how she contacted the appellant’s parents by phone the following day informed the appellant’s parents of the position. She was told that then (sic) they wanted nothing more to do with the appellant and that she should not return to India; she (that is the appellant) brought shame to the family. [RK] continue (sic) to look after the appellant and now describes her as a great close friend. She considered that the appellant’s life will be in extreme danger should she be forced to leave the UK due to her vulnerability and current health conditions. The appellant herself in all her statements were (sic) adopted set out how her family had disowned her and how she feared return because the consequences of that.
I found [RK] to be of a (sic) open and honest witness. What is material in relation to this request for international protection is that there is no satisfactory evidence to indicate an active or even historical attempt by the appellant's family to use violence against her. The case essentially is that on return to India she will be without male support, she has a failed marriage (it is unclear whether her husband ever divorced her not), she has physical disability and suffers from depression.
Although the respondent did not accept the appellant’s credibility, overall I am satisfied on the lower standard of proof that the core of the appellant’s case as I set out above is correct. The appellant was seen by a psychiatrist Dr Persaud in 2014. Irrespective his conclusions and to what extent there (sic) still relevant today he does commenced (sic) his report by noting that the appellant walked with a pronounced limp. His view was “I suspect this has had a major impact on her mental state psychology personality (sic). This is (sic) rendered her more vulnerable (sic) terms of manipulation and exploitation from others is (sic) also rendered her more vulnerable mental health issues (sic) my opinion”. The appellant although she describes her father as a traditional person clearly permitted and encouraged her to obtain education and employment as a teacher in his traditional school in India prior to her departure. She described how she went to her place of employment by bus travelling alone. Whilst it is clear that a marriage with [RS] was not genuine from his perspective there is no evidence that the relevant documentation given to the respondent for the issue of the dependent visa to [RS] was other than correct. I am satisfied that the appellant like many other young vulnerable persons succumbed to the charms and promises of a better life, altering their position as a consequence with serious long-term effects for them when those promises turned out to be false.”
2025 Decision
13. The Judge noted at [20] that the issues for determination were whether there:
a) would be very significant obstacles to the First and Second Appellants' integration in India (Appendix PL 5.1, Immigration Rules);
b) were other exceptional or compelling reasons outside the Immigration Rules to justify a grant of leave to remain under Article 8.
14. Under the heading ‘Findings’ the Judge at [25]-[29] outlined his findings of fact in relation to the First and Second Appellants as they are relevant to their grounds of appeal in this matter:
“[The First Appellant’s] evidence was that she is disabled by a polio infection as a child and diabetic. Polio had led to weak muscles on one side, and [the First Appellant] walks with a limp. She had arrived in the United Kingdom on a student visa in December 2010 (aged 26) with her then-husband, [RS] (not the [Second Appellant]), who she had married for love. According to a photograph of a marriage certificate in the appellants’ bundle, the marriage was on 10 January 2010. [RS] abandoned [the First Appellant] at the airport. Her evidence was that she was looking to return to India and she called her parents, but they disowned her because she had married for love. That marriage had taken place about 11 months previously, and there is no suggestion that [the First Appellant’s] family had disowned her during the period between her marriage and her arrival in the UK. I do not find it credible that it was only at this stage that [the First Appellant’s] family took issue with her marriage. [The First Appellant’s] evidence was that [RK] had found [the First Appellant] and taken [the First Appellant] to live with her. I do not consider that I need to reach a finding about how credible or not credible it is that a stranger would take in [the First Appellant] in these circumstances and on this fact, I will take [the First Appellant’s] case at its highest and I will not treat this fact as damaging [the First Appellant’s] credibility in any respect. [The First Appellant] had started her studies, and worked part-time, but after six months had been asked to pay a further fee, did not have the money and had left college. [The First Appellant] had leave to remain until February 2012, but by interrupting her studies, the grounds on which she had sought leave to remain ended. There is no evidence that she tried to leave the United Kingdom; her own evidence was that she had never spoken to her family again.
[The First Appellant] cooked and cleaned for [RK].
[The Second Appellant] arrived in the United Kingdom in October 2009 as a student. He was granted just over one year's leave to remain. He did not explain in evidence why he had over-stayed his visa so significantly, and so no reason has been given why he could not have returned to India. He says that he does not know how the Indian tax system worked, but he would be able to ask people in India, including his family and others. He is an educated man. So this is a very weak reason against return indeed, He did not meet [the First Appellant] until 2016, by which time he had overstayed by more than 5 years.
The adult appellants were each educated to the level of a bachelor's degree in India. [The First Appellant] worked as a teacher before coming to the United Kingdom and [the Second Appellant] worked he said in part-time jobs, including selling insurance for 6-9 months.
[The First Appellant] met [the Second Appellant] because he was also living with [RK]. He did not explain how he had come to live there or how long they had been living there by 2016. [The First Appellant] and [the Second Appellant] said that they fell in love and decided to live together.”
15. The Judge made the following observation at [54] in relation to the evidence of the support that may be provided to the Appellants should they return to India:
“It is commonplace in appeals of this sort for every witness to say that no support could be provided in the event of return. I do not think that I can take that assertion at face value in this case. The appellants have received a very significant degree of material support in the United Kingdom for a very long time, extending to provision of accommodation, food, clothing, transport, heating, entertainment, and other material needs. I do not consider it credible that if the appellants were to return to India, in fact no support would be provided to them. In my judgment, it is inconceivable that the community which has extended such charity and support to the appellants would leave them destitute in India. In any event, since the appellants are well-educated and capable of working - and since the impediment here comes from their lack of leave to remain and nothing else - they would be able to work in India and support themselves, and would therefore need only short-term support to establish themselves. [The Second Appellant] has family in India, even if [the First Appellant] is estranged from hers. And if [the Second Appellant’s] family are capable of accommodating his sister’s mother-in-law, and given the appellants' broad support network, I conclude that the appellants are unlikely to be left destitute in India for the time it would take to establish themselves in work, so as to be able to support themselves. If [the First Appellant’s] ability to work is affected by childcare commitments, there is no evidence as to why [the Second Appellant’s] family could not provide that childcare as part of an extended family support network.”
16. The Judge stated at [60] that he was not satisfied “that there would be very significant obstacles to the integration of the appellants in India.” In making this finding he had regard to following evidence in relation to the First and Second Appellants:
“[They] grew up in India and were educated there to undergraduate level. They live in the UK in a family with close personal connections to India. They have friends who are of Indian national origin. [The Second Appellant] remains in contact with his family in India. The appellants speak Punjabi. They would be unlikely to stand out physically in India. The [First and Second Appellants] are well educated, and each is capable of working in India, as they previously have. The health needs of the [First and Second Appellants] are likely to be capable of being met, and they are in any event not so serious as to act as an obstacle to integration in India. I accept that there may be challenges in terms of accommodation and employment and there may be a difference in standards of living, but I do not consider that any of these factors amount to very significant obstacles to integration. I therefore conclude that the requirements of the applicable Immigration Rules have not been met.”
17. The Judge found at [62] that the Appellants enjoy family and private life in the UK, but their ties to the UK were not strong:
“However, the appellants’ private life ties to the UK are relatively weak: neither adult works in the United Kingdom, or has evidence of a developed private life. The only evidence of private life ties beyond the providers of accommodation and material support to them pre-dates the birth of the children. The evidence of material support did not suggest that this material support was, or was part of, a strong private life tie. In my judgment, the children are so young that they have not yet developed to any meaningful extent the ties and other factors which constitute private life, although I accept that they have made connections with the wider group of people who have cared for them, and especially [MC].
The appellants are a family unit. However, removal of the appellants as a family from the United Kingdom would not interfere with their family life, which would continue uninterrupted, and I have concluded that it would be in the best interests of the children to leave the United Kingdom if their parents left. I therefore conclude that removal would not have consequences of sufficient seriousness to engage article 8(1) insofar as it protects family life.
I find that the respondent’s decision causes an interference with the adult appellants’ enjoyment of their private life. However, given the relative weakness of the adult appellants’ private lives in the United Kingdom, I am not satisfied that the likely consequences of the interference are sufficiently serious as to engage article 8(1).”
18. The Judge then considered the position if he were “wrong about the seriousness of the likely consequences of removal on the appellants’ private lives” at [66] and considered the competing public and individual factors by reference to section 117B of the NIAA 2002 at [69]-[70]:
“I weigh the following factors against the appellants:
(i) The appellants have failed to satisfy the Immigration Rules, which carries significant weight.
(ii) The adult appellants’ private lives in the United Kingdom first developed while their immigration status was precarious, and continued after they ceased to have leave to remain and ought to have left the United Kingdom (and remained here unlawfully).
(iii) The evidence of the adult appellants’ private life ties to the United Kingdom is relatively weak; they appear to have formed and maintained few relationships here.
(iv) Removal to India would not affect the appellants' ability to maintain those relationships at a distance, and would not prevent them forming new relationships.
I weigh the following factors in the appellant's favour:
(i) The adult appellants speak English
(ii) The adult appellants are capable of being economically active and therefore financially independent.
(iii) There have been some delays in the resolution of [the First and Second Appellants’] applications to the Home Office which are not their fault and during which their private life ties are likely to have become stronger (albeit there is little concrete evidence of strengthening ties).
(iv) There will be some difficulties for the appellants if returning to India, as set out above, albeit, they will fall short of the standard set by the Immigration Rules for a grant of leave to remain.
(v) The best interests of the children weigh, albeit to a limited extent, against removal, because of the effect of removal on the relationships between the children and those who have provided care and support for them as children. I remind myself that the third and fourth appellants’ best interests are in themselves a primary consideration, but not a consideration that necessarily outweighs others.”
19. Balancing these factors, the Judge concluded at [71]:
“[the] respondent has satisfied me that the public interest in the maintenance of effective immigration control outweighs the appellants’ respect for their private lives because the private life circumstances are relatively weak, and the appellants' inability to meet the requirements of the Immigration Rules is a weighty factor, especially in circumstances where the adult appellants knowingly developed their private lives as overstayers. The adult appellants’ ability to speak English and to work are more neutral than positive factors, since they do not mitigate the consequences of the appellants’ conduct on effective immigration control, and the public interest in focusing expenditure of scarce public funds and allocation of scarce public resources and access to the employment market to meet the needs of United Kingdom citizens and persons lawfully in the country, and correspondingly in limiting the use of such resources and access to such opportunities for those in the United Kingdom unlawfully. The delays have not been extensive or severe, and the delay in resolving [the First Appellant’s] asylum claim ultimately led to its dismissal; those delays have not in fact significantly strengthened [the First Appellant’s] private life ties and they have not created an impression that [the First Appellant] would be able to remain in the United Kingdom. The fact that there is some effect on the appellants and on the interests of the children are not factors which in my judgment outweigh the strong competing factors (although I again remind myself of the primary importance of the children's best interests).”
20. The Judge determined that the Respondent’s decision to refuse the Appellants leave to remain on human rights grounds was not unlawful under section 6, Human Rights Act 1998 and dismissed the appeal (at [72]).
Permission to appeal to Upper Tribunal
21. On 10 February 2026, the Appellants applied for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal giving the following reasons for their application:
“We are not satisfied with the decision the judge has given as there was a failure to consider my medical condition and that I am a disabled mother of two young girls. I am suffering from depression and diabetes and other health conditions.
My familial circumstances are poor and I cannot go back home to India as I do not speak to my family there. I also have little contact with my partner’s family as they speak to me rarely through him and not to me directly. This is also the case with my children, my partner’s mother does not speak to them. My concern is that if we cannot even speak on the phone with them, I find it (sic) that we will not be able to live with them. I do not find the environment safe for my children as seeing recent events I am shocked. Recently in Jalandar Punjab a fourteen year old girl was raped and killed by her fifty year old neighbour. I do not see this as a safe place to raise my young children and compared to an environment like that, the UK is much safer. Even thinking about it is quite daunting.
The judge did not even respect my private life, stating that we are not a sufficient family. We are indeed a family and cannot live without each other. I do not trust that if we were to move to India as if we were to move there my partner’s mother may have too much influence over him and leave me and my children separate (sic).
In addition to this, my children are currently stateless and if I were to register in the Indian High Commission they require a marriage certificate which is not possible.
My eldest, daughter is currently in speech and language therapy and I am currently waiting for an appointment at the children’s development centre for her. Leaving at such a crucial time will impact both of their development.”
22. Permission to appeal on all grounds was granted by the Upper Tribunal Judge:
I grant permission on a Robinson-obvious ground. At [25], the FtT rejected the credibility of MK’s claim to have been disowned by her family on arrival in the UK, and refrained from making a finding on whether she was then supported by the friend I shall call RK. There is no mention of the 2018 appeal decision, in which both those facts, MK’s “core account” and the evidence of RK were all accepted, nor the Devaseelan principles. Failure to recognise that those findings stood as the starting point, or to reason otherwise, stands as an arguable error of law. While mindful of the FtT’s detailed findings elsewhere, including the alternative finding at [60], and the guidance given in AZ (error of law: jurisdiction; PTA practice) [2018] UKUT 245 (IAC), the case merits full consideration by the Upper Tribunal. All grounds may be argued.
23. The Respondent filed a Rule 24 response (‘RR24’) dated 14 April 2026 and the Appellants filed a Rule 25 reply (‘AR25’).
Upper Tribunal hearing and submissions
24. The oral and written submissions at the hearing are a matter of record and need not be set out in full here. The Tribunal had access to all the documents before the First-tier Tribunal and the composite bundle filed by the Appellants.
25. The Tribunal heard oral submissions from Mr Waheed for the Appellants, and Ms Khan for the Respondent, which I have fully taken into account, together with the Respondent’s Rule 24 response and the Appellant’s Rule 25 reply.
Appellants
26. The Judge materially erred by failing to take into account the prior findings in the 2018 Decision at [1]-[6] that the First Appellant was abandoned by her husband, RS, on arrival at Heathrow airport on 8 December 2010, that RS had married the First Appellant simply to gain entry to the UK, and that RK, out of kindness, took the First Appellant into her home at the request of a mutual friend (AR25 at [3]). In the 2018 Decision, the Judge found the First Appellant to be a credible witness.
27. The Judge at [4] of the 2018 Decision, referred to RK’s oral evidence that she telephoned the First Appellant’s parents the day after she took the First Appellant into her home to tell them that she had been abandoned at Heathrow airport, leaving the First Appellant distraught and hysterical. RK explained to the Judge that the First Appellant’s parents told the First Appellant that they wanted nothing to do with her, that the First Appellant should not return to India, and that the First Appellant had brought nothing more than shame on the family, given her love marriage to RS. That account was accepted by the Judge in the 2018 Decision per his analysis at [6] (AR25 at [4]).
28. In the 2025 Decision, the Judge at [25] did not accept the truth of the First Appellant’s evidence that she was abandoned by RS at Heathrow airport in December 2010, that her own family had ex communicated her due to her marriage to RS, and that she was only able to be safely housed and looked after out of the kindness of a then stranger, RK (AR25 at [5]).
29. The Judge at [25] considered the First Appellant's account as lacking credibility. That approach was, as a matter of law, incorrect per [39(1)] of Devaseelan (Second Appeals, ECHR, Extra-Territorial Effect) [2002] UKIAT 702 (‘Devaseelan’) (AR25 at [5]).
30. The Judge's reservation at [25] of the First Appellant’s account of being taken in by a stranger, RK, following her abandonment by RS, was equally an incorrect approach per Devaseelan. (AR25 at [6]).
31. The failure by the Judge to accept, per Devaseelan, the evidence of the First Appellant being ex communicated by her family due to her marriage to RS, was not academic, as that ex communication was a relevant consideration, per the ASA at [18], when assessing the difficulty the Appellant family, including the Third and Fourth Appellants as children, may face living in India. The lack of a support network from the First Appellant's family in India was a matter which should have been taken into account by the Judge when assessing the proportionality of removal, and the best interests of the Fourth and Third Appellants as children. The failure by the Judge to do so was a material error (AR25 at [7]).
32. The Judge materially erred when determining at [55] that the Appellants could be accommodated by the family of the Second Appellant on return to India. In reaching that conclusion, the Judge failed to acknowledge, let alone take adequate account of the sworn evidence in the witness statement of the First Appellant at [18], and the witness statement of the Second Appellant at [11], that she would not be accepted by the Second Appellant’s family given their disapproval of the relationship and the First Appellant’s medical conditions. (AR25 at [8]). The Second Appellant’s family refuse to talk directly to either the First Appellant or the children, and this fractured relationship should have been given proper account by the Judge when assessing the proportionality of removal under Article 8 ECHR, with reference to the children’s best interests under section 55, and whether the family would face very significant difficulty on return under PL 5.1(b (AR25 at [9]).
Respondent
33. The grounds amount to no more than an attempt to reargue the appeal (RR24 at [5]). The Judge gave a full and detailed decision in response to the issues raised, namely whether there would be very significant obstacles to the First and Second Appellants’ integration in India, and whether were exceptional / compelling reasons to grant leave under Article 8 (at [20(a)] and [20(b)]). The Judge also considered the best interests of the children to be in issue (at [21]) (RR24 at [5]).
34. In relation to the ‘Robinson-obvious’ ground, Ms Khan argued that this ground is only relevant to asylum claims and this appeal relates to a private life claim. The Judge at [25] of the 2025 Decision noted that he did not find it credible that it was only when the RK contacted the First Appellant’s family in India to tell them that RS had abandoned the First Appellant at the airport that they took issue with the First Appellant’s marriage to RK, as there was no suggestion that she had been disowned by her family in the 11 months from the date of their marriage on 10 January 2010, as evidenced by the photo of the marriage certificate, and their departure from India to the UK in December 2010. The Judge’s finding on credibility was in relation to the timing of when the First Appellant was abandoned by her family.
35. Even if it is found that the Judge should have considered the First Appellant’s familial circumstances in India with regards to whether her family had disowned her, the Judge considered an alternative argument relevant to their reintegration into India. The Judge found that the Appellants could live as an independent family unit (at [54]) as both the First and Second Appellants are educated and capable of working and supporting themselves, and therefore they would only need short-term support from family. The Judge at [60] found for a variety of reasons that there were no very significant obstacles to the integration of the Appellants in India. The Judge considered the health of the First Appellant, the First and Second Appellants’ education in India to undergraduate level, and that the Second Appellant remains in contact with his family in India. This is relevant to the materiality of the error to the outcome if the Judge should have considered the First Appellant’s estrangement from her family in the proportionality assessment.
36. With regard to the 2018 Decision, it was not binding on the Judge. Deevaselan makes clear that it is the starting point, and it was open to the Judge to make findings based on the evidence. Even if it was a relevant factor which should have been considered, the Judge at [25] noted that evidence of the support given to her by RK would not be treated as a fact to damage the First Appellant’s credibility. These are factors that do not materially impact the outcome of the Decision. In this case the Judge had to consider whether there were very significant obstacles to the Appellants’ integration. The Judge at [60] found for a variety of reasons that there were no very significant obstacles. Even if is accepted that the Judge should have acknowledged the principles in Deevaselan, it would not have materially impacted the outcome of the 2025 Decision because the Judge undertook a holistic consideration of the relevant matters. The Decision should be read as a whole and in context.
37. Both parties agreed that the matter should be retained in the Upper Tribunal.
Decision on error of law
38. Having carefully considered the oral and written submissions made to the Tribunal and the relevant parts of the 2025 Decision, I have concluded, for the reasons that follow, that the Decision does not contain a material error of law and shall stand.
Legal principles
Appellate restraint
39. When considering whether the Judge made a material error of law, I remind myself of the limited circumstances in which an appellate tribunal may interfere with findings of fact and credibility by the First-tier Judge. In Volpi & Anor v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464; [2022] 4 W.L.R. 48 (‘Volpi’) Lewison LJ, with whom Males and Snowden LJJ agreed, explained interference with findings of fact and credibility is appropriate only where such a finding is ‘plainly wrong’ or ‘rationally insupportable’ at [2]:
“The appeal is therefore an appeal on a pure question of fact. The approach of an appeal court to that kind of appeal is a well-trodden path. It is unnecessary to refer in detail to the many cases that have discussed it; but the following principles are well-settled:
(i) An appeal court should not interfere with the trial judge's conclusions on primary facts unless it is satisfied that he was plainly wrong.
(ii) The adverb “plainly” does not refer to the degree of confidence felt by the appeal court that it would not have reached the same conclusion as the trial judge. It does not matter, with whatever degree of certainty, that the appeal court considers that it would have reached a different conclusion. What matters is whether the decision under appeal is one that no reasonable judge could have reached.
(iii) An appeal court is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the trial judge has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration. The mere fact that a judge does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that he overlooked it.
(iv) The validity of the findings of fact made by a trial judge is not aptly tested by considering whether the judgment presents a balanced account of the evidence. The trial judge must of course consider all the material evidence (although it need not all be discussed in his judgment). The weight which he gives to it is however pre-eminently a matter for him.
(v) An appeal court can therefore set aside a judgment on the basis that the judge failed to give the evidence a balanced consideration only if the judge's conclusion was rationally insupportable.
(vi) Reasons for judgment will always be capable of having been better expressed. An appeal court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as though it was a piece of legislation or a contract.”
40. The Court of Appeal has recognised that the First-tier Tribunal is a specialist fact-finding tribunal, and the Upper Tribunal is required to exercise restraint in its oversight of its reasoning: In Ullah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWCA Civ 201; [2024] 1 W.L.R. 4055 (‘Ullah’) Green LJ, with whom Lewison and Andrews LJJ agreed, stated at [26]:
“Sections 11 and 12 TCEA 2007 Act restricts the UT’s jurisdiction to errors of law. It is settled that:
(i) the FTT is a specialist fact-finding tribunal. The UT should not rush to find an error of law simply because it might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently: see AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 49 [2008] 1 AC 678 at paragraph [30];
(ii) where a relevant point was not expressly mentioned by the FTT, the UT should be slow to infer that it had not been taken into account: e.g. MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 49 at paragraph [45];
(iii) when it comes to the reasons given by the FTT, the UT should exercise judicial restraint and not assume that the FTT misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning was fully set out: see R (Jones) v First Tier Tribunal and Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority [2013] UKSC 19 at paragraph [25];
(iv) the issues for decision and the basis upon which the FTT reaches its decision on those issues may be set out directly or by inference: see UT (Sri Lanka) v The Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 1095 at paragraph [27];
(v) judges sitting in the FTT are to be taken to be aware of the relevant authorities and to be seeking to apply them. There is no need for them to be referred to specifically, unless it was clear from their language that they had failed to do so: see AA (Nigeria) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2020] EWCA Civ 1296 at paragraph [34];
(vi) it is of the nature of assessment that different tribunals, without illegality or irrationality, may reach different conclusions on the same case. The mere fact that one tribunal has reached what might appear to be an unusually generous view of the facts does not mean that it has made an error of law: see MM (Lebanon) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] UKSC 10 at paragraph [107].”
41. These principles were recently approved by Bean LJ in Kapikanya v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 987 at [20]-[21, and Dove LJ in MN (Vietnam) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2026] EWCA Civ 485 (‘MN Vietnam’) at [36]:
AZ and Robinson obvious points
42. Headnote 3 of the Upper Tribunal’s decision in AZ (error of law: jurisdiction, PTA practice) (Iran) [2018] UKUT 45 (‘AZ’) states:
“Permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal should be granted on a ground that was not advanced by an applicant for permission, only if:
(a) the judge is satisfied that the ground he or she has identified is one which has a strong prospect of success:
(i) for the original appellant; or
(ii) for the Secretary of State, where the ground relates to a decision which, if undisturbed, would breach the United Kingdom’s international Treaty obligations; or
(b) (possibly) the ground relates to an issue of general importance, which the Upper Tribunal needs to address.”
43. In AZ, the Upper Tribunal at [62] referred to the Court of Appeal’s judgment in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department; ex parte Robinson [1998] QB 929 (‘Robinson’) at [38]-[39]:
“… the Court of Appeal was concerned with an application for judicial review of a refusal by the Immigration Appeal Tribunal of permission to appeal against a decision of a special adjudicator. The court said:-
“It is …. necessary for us to identify the circumstances in which it might be appropriate for the Tribunal to grant leave to appeal on the basis of an argument not advanced before the special adjudicator, or for a High Court judge to grant leave to apply for judicial review of a refusal of leave by the Tribunal in relation to a point not taken in the Notice of Appeal to the Tribunal.
Because the rules place an onus on the asylum-seeker to state his grounds of appeal, we consider that it would be wrong to say that merely arguability should be the criterion to be applied for the grant of leave in such circumstances. A higher hurdle is required. The appellate authorities should of course focus primarily on the arguments adduced before them, whether these are to be found in the oral argument before the special adjudicator or, so far as the Tribunal is concerned, in the written grounds of appeal on which leave to appeal is sought. They are not required to engage in a search for new points. If there is readily discernible an obvious point of Convention law which favours the applicant although he has not taken it, then the special adjudicator should apply it in his favour, but he should feel under no obligation to prolong the hearing by asking the parties for submissions on points which they have not taken but which could be properly categorised as merely “arguable” as opposed to “obvious”. Similarly, if when the Tribunal reads the Special Adjudicator’s decision there is an obvious point of Convention law favourable to the asylum-seeker which does not appear in the decision, it should grant leave to appeal. If it does not do so, there will be a danger that this country will be in breach of its obligations under the Convention. When we refer to an obvious point we mean a point which has a strong prospect of success if it is argued. Nothing less will do. It follows that leave to apply for judicial review of a refusal by the Tribunal to grant leave to appeal should be granted if the judge is of the opinion that it is properly arguable that a point not raised in the Grounds of Appeal to the Tribunal had a strong prospect of success if leave to appeal were to be granted.”
44. The Upper Tribunal in AZ further explained at [63]-[64]:
“As is pointed out at 4.222 of Jacobs, Tribunal Practice and Procedure (Fourth Edition), the “Robinson” approach was, in effect, extended to all Tribunals by Scott Baker J in R (Begum) v Social Security Commissioners [2002] EWHC 401 (Admin). This was on the ground that it would be confusing and without logic to apply different tests. Here, also, the court emphasised that mere arguability is not the test and that a higher hurdle must be surmounted. The point had to be obvious, in the sense of being one with a strong prospect of success, were permission to be granted (see paragraphs 20 and 31).
In its application to asylum law, the “Robinson” approach applies only in favour of the individual, who is seeking asylum; not in favour of the Secretary of State. An exception, however, arises where the point identified concerns a possible breach of the Refugee Convention, which would result from recognising a person as a refugee who is, in fact, covered by one of the exclusion clauses in the Refugee Convention (see, in this regard, paragraph 21.38 of MacDonald’s Immigration Law and Practice (Ninth Edition) and A (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 1438.”
45. The Upper Tribunal in AZ concluded as follows at [69]-[70]:
“In conclusion, we consider that any judge who is considering whether to grant permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal must not grant permission on a ground which does not feature in the grounds accompanying the application, unless the judge is satisfied that the ground he or she has identified is one which has a strong prospect of success for the original appellant; or for the Secretary of State, where the ground relates to a decision which, if undisturbed, would breach the United Kingdom’s international treaty obligations; or (possibly) if the ground relates to an issue of general importance, which the Upper Tribunal needs to address.
The basic point to be borne in mind is that there must be an extremely sound reason for, in effect, compelling the parties to an appeal to engage with a matter that neither of them has identified.”
46. In Durueke (PTA: AZ applied, proper approach) [2019] UKUT 00197 (‘Durueke’), the Upper Tribunal gave the following guidance to judges considering applications for permission to appeal:
“... if permission is granted on a ground that has not been raised by the parties, it is good practice and a useful aid in the exercise of self-restraint for the permission judge to indicate which aspect of head-note 3 of AZ applies.”
Devaseelan guidelines
47. In its decision in Devaseelan, the Upper Tribunal provided the following guidance:
“In our view the second Adjudicator should treat such matters in the following way.
(1) The first Adjudicator’s determination should always be the starting-point. It is the authoritative assessment of the Appellant’s status at the time it was made. In principle issues such as whether the Appellant was properly represented, or whether he gave evidence, are irrelevant to this.” [emphasis in original]
…
48. In LD (Algeria) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] EWCA Civ 804 (also cited as Djebbar), Judge LJ emphasised that the Devaseelan guidelines are not intended to be inflexible at [30] and [40]:
“Perhaps the most important feature of the guidance is that the fundamental obligation of every special adjudicator independently to decide each new application on its own individual merits was preserved. The guidance was expressly subject to this overriding principle.
…
The great value of the guidance is that it invests the decision making process in each individual fresh application with the necessary degree of sensible flexibility and desirable consistency of approach, without imposing any unacceptable restrictions on the second adjudicator’s ability to make the findings which he conscientiously believes to be right. It therefore admirably fulfils its intended purpose.”
49. The authorities are clear, that whilst the previous determination should always be the starting point, it is not the end point. In Secretary of State for the Home Department v Patel [2022] EWCA Civ 36, Davis LJ stated at [31]:
“The essential position is that the second FTT judge cannot be subject to any principles of estoppel in relation to an earlier finding. Rather, the judge must conscientiously decide the case in front of them applying principles of fairness. Those principles include the potential unfairness of requiring a party to re-litigate a point on which they have previously succeeded. These propositions were drawn from Devaseelan, Djebbar v SSHD [2004] EWCA Civ 804 and BK (Afghanistan) [[2019] EWCA Civ 1358].”
50. Most recently, in KD v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2026] EWCA Civ 349 the Court of Appeal stated at [65]-[66]:
“The guidelines in Devaseelan are an important weapon in the armoury of tribunals seeking to achieve a consistent approach that is fair to all parties when faced with similar or repeat appeals. However, as Dove LJ observed during argument, there is a danger that, being so familiar to specialist judges, they are not fully applied.
To illustrate, the first guideline, which created the concept of a ‘Devaseelan starting point’, calls for more than a recognition that there has been a previous decision. In order to identify the true location of the starting point for its own journey, the second tribunal must identify the scope of the issue(s) that may be common to the two appeals, and analyse what the first tribunal found and why. It is only by doing this that it can know what significance should properly be attached to the first appeal decision, before going on to apply the guidance as a whole. The other guidelines, insofar as they are relevant to the inquiry in the individual case, require equal consideration. A broad statement by the second tribunal that it is treating the first tribunal's decision as its starting point is not an application of the Devaseelan guidance and is likely to lead to error, one way or another.”
51. In addition to the principles above, I also remind myself of the ‘Practice Direction from the Senior President of Tribunals: Reasons for decisions’ dated 4 July 2024 (‘Practice Direction’):
“Providing adequate reasons does not usually require the First-tier Tribunal to identify all of the evidence relied upon in reaching its findings of fact, to elaborate at length its conclusions on any issue of law, or to express every step of its reasoning. The reasons provided for any decision should be proportionate, not only to the resources of the Tribunal, but to the significance and complexity of the issues that have to be decided. Reasons need refer only to the main issues and evidence in dispute, and explain how those issues essential to the Tribunal’s conclusion have been resolved.
Stating reasons at any greater length than is necessary in the particular case is not in the interests of justice. To do so is an inefficient use of judicial time, does not assist either the parties or an appellate court or tribunal, and is therefore inconsistent with the overriding objective. Providing concise reasons is to be encouraged. Adequate reasons for a substantive decision may often be short. In some cases a few succinct paragraphs will suffice. For a procedural decision the reasons required will usually be shorter.”
Consideration
52. In the PTA Decision, the Upper Tribunal Judge stated that permission to appeal was granted on a “Robinson-obvious ground”, specifically that the Judge in the 2025 Decision rejected the credibility of the First Appellant’s claim to have been disowned by her family on arrival in the UK and refrained from making a finding on whether she was then supported by RK. By not referring to the findings of fact made by the Judge in the 2018 Decision, and recognising that these stood as the starting point, the Judge failed to apply the Devaseelan guidelines, and thereby it was arguable this amounted to an error of law.
53. In relation to the PTA Decision, I make the following observations. First, the appeal does not involve a ‘Robinson-obvious’ point of challenge. In its recent decision in AL v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2026] EWCA Civ 370, the Court of Appeal reviewed the principle in Robinson at [66]-[69]. Giving the judgment of the Court, Laing LJ stated at [69]:
“The principle in Robinson is a narrow principle. It is limited to points of refugee law which favour a person who claims to be a refugee, and which are ‘obvious’ and arguable with ‘strong prospects of success’. The reason for that principle is that it is necessary to enable the United Kingdom to comply with its obligations under the Refugee Convention.”
54. It is clear from this passage that ‘Robinson-obvious’ points are limited to points of refugee law favourable to the appellant which have strong prospects of success. The present appeal does not involve claims made under refugee law.
55. Secondly, the guidance in headnote 3 of AZ is not limited to refugee law and is equally directed to the issue of whether permission should be granted in relation to a ground which had not been advanced by the appellant. However, as the Upper Tribunal said in AZ at [63], it is clear from the authorities that “mere arguability” of a point is not a sufficient basis for a grant of permission to appeal on the ground, and “a higher hurdle must be surmounted.” The point must be “obvious, in the sense of being one with a strong prospect of success, were permission to be granted.” In the PTA Decision, the Upper Tribunal did not, consistently with the guidance given in Durueke, indicate which aspect of headnote 3 of AZ applied, but it can be inferred that it was [3(a)(i)]. The Upper Tribunal described the Deevaseelan ground as ‘arguable’ but did not detail why it had a strong prospect of success if permission on this ground were granted. It is arguable therefore that the wrong test was applied by the Upper Tribunal when granting permission to appeal based on the Judge’s failure in the 2025 Decision to apply the Devaseelan guidelines. However, as the Upper Tribunal expressly granted permission to appeal on “all grounds”, I am satisfied that I can still lawfully consider the appeal.
56. Consistently with the Devaseelan guidelines, the Judge was required to take the findings in the 2018 Decision as the starting point. Although the Judge did not expressly refer to the findings in the 2018 Decision, he was evidently aware of the 2018 Decision as he referenced it at [10]. The Judge was not required to set out in full the factual findings in the 2018 Decision. To do so would have been unnecessary since both parties were aware of these findings, and it would have been contrary to the Practice Direction for the findings to have been detailed in full in the 2025 Decision.
57. At [25] of the Decision, the Judge made findings of fact relevant to the First Appellant which are largely consistent with the findings in the 2018 Decision in relation to the First Appellant’s arrival to the UK with RS, and him abandoning her at the airport. The Judge however made a finding that it was unlikely that the First Appellant only became estranged from her family after she had arrived in the UK. This finding was based on the certificate evidencing the marriage of the First Appellant and RS on 10 January 2010, some 11 months before the couple arrived in the UK. While not questioning the estrangement of the First Appellant from her family, the Judge considered that the marriage certificate before the Tribunal, which apparently was not in evidence during the 2018 appeal, cast doubt on the First Appellant’s account as to the timing of when her family abandoned her due to her love marriage with RS. This was a finding which was open to the Judge to make, based on the marriage certificate, which indicated that the couple married many months prior to their arrival in the UK.
58. It is clear from a holistic reading of the 2025 Decision that the Judge took the 2018 Decision as his starting point, as required by the Deveseelan guidelines, but he also considered the evidence before the Tribunal as he was entitled and required to do. The date of the First Appellant and RS’s nuptials shown in the marriage certificate provided a basis for the Judge to depart from the finding in the 2018 Decision as to the credibility of the First Appellant’s core account that her family disowned her after she was abandoned by RS at the airport following their arrival in the UK. In relation to the First Appellant’s claim that RK, a person she had not previously met, had taken the First Appellant into her home following her being abandoned at the airport, the Judge expressly stated that he did not need to make a finding as to whether this was credible, and that he would not treat it as damaging the First Appellant’s credibility in any respect.
59. I accept that the Judge did not cite Devaseelan nor the guidelines for which it is authority. I have had regard to paragraph (v) of the guidance in Ullah that First-tier Tribunal judges are taken to be aware of relevant authorities and to be seeking to apply them, and a judge need not specifically refer to an authority “unless it is clear from their language that they had failed to do so.” I am satisfied that the Judge, consistently with Devaseelan, proceeded on the basis that the 2018 Decision was the starting point, and then considered the evidence before the Tribunal and made credibility findings that departed from those made by the Judge in the 2018 Decision.
60. I also accept that the Judge could have stated with greater clarity that the credibility finding was based on the evidence of the date of the First Appellant’s marriage to RS, which made it unlikely that the First Appellant’s family, who disapproved of her love marriage to RS, only disowned her after she arrived in the UK and was abandoned at the airport. However, the 2025 Decision as drafted is adequate and the reasons are ascertainable. The Judge reached conclusions that were reasonably open to him upon the evidence, and those conclusions were adequately explained. As such, I find there is no error of law.
61. If, by not adopting the credibility findings in the 2018 Decision, the Judge did fall into error based on a failure to comply with the Devaseelan guidlines, I am satisfied that the error was not material to the outcome. The Judge’s conclusion that there were no very significant obstacles to the Appellants’ integration into India would not have differed, as it was strongly grounded in a range of factors, including the education of the Appellants and their potential to obtain work and live independently such that they would not need to rely on family for support. It was open to the Judge to determine the weight to be given to the relevant factors in conducting the proportionality assessment which is a fact-sensitive evaluative judgment for the Judge to make. The question is not whether another Judge may have struck the balance differently, but whether the conclusion reached was one that was reasonably open to the Judge on the evidence. I find that it was such a conclusion.
62. It follows that I am not satisfied that the grounds of appeal are made out.
Notice of Decision
63. The Decision of the First-tier Tribunal promulgated on 24 November 2025 which had dismissed the Appellants’ appeal did not involve the making of a material error of law and shall stand.

Linda Kirk

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

6 August 2026