The decision



Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Numbers: VA/02438/2015
VA/02435/2015
VA/02432/2015
VA/02431/2015

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Heard at Field House
Decision & Reasons Promulgated
On 17 November 2016
On 2 December 2016


Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE PERKINS

Between


Noshaba Yousaf
First Appellant

[M H]
Second Appellant

[S H1]
Third Appellant

[S H2]
Fourth Appellant
(Anonymity direction not made)

and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellants: Mr S Shah, Solicitor from 786 Law Associates
For the Respondent: Mr S Staunton, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer
DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellants in this case are closely related members of the same family. They appealed unsuccessfully to the First-tier Tribunal against the decision of the respondent, by an Entry Clearance Officer, to refuse them entry clearance to the United Kingdom as visitors.
2. The application of the first appellant, Noshaba Yousaf, was refused under paragraph 41 of HC 395 and additionally under paragraph 320(7A) of HC 395. It was refused under paragraph 320(7A) because the respondent was satisfied that the application was supported by a "falsified or non-genuine document". Further the fact that she had relied upon a false document caused the respondent not to be satisfied that she intended only a short stay. She concluded that the first appellant did not satisfy the requirements of the Rules specific to visitors.
3. The application of the second appellant, [MH] was refused under paragraph 46A of HC 395 which applies only to visitor applications by children. The second appellant was born in 2012 and his application was dependent on that of his mother. The respondent decided that as the first appellant was not travelling to the United Kingdom and there was no suggestion that he would travel without her the application would be refused because the respondent was "not satisfied as to your intentions". Similar decisions were made in the cases of the third appellant, [SH1] who was born in 2004 and the fourth appellant, [SH2] who was born in 2005. The notices of immigration decision relating to each of their cases makes no mention of paragraph 320(7A) of HC 395.
4. The appellants were told, correctly, that they could only appeal on human rights grounds. They lodged appeals and the appeals came before First-tier Tribunal Judge Reid. Judge Reid, correctly, began by asking herself if Article 8 was "engaged" and she decided in each case that the relationship between the proposed visitors and the people they wished to see in the United Kingdom was not one that the United Kingdom was obliged to promote. That being so there was no breach of Article 8 and there was nothing more to decide. The Judge dismissed the appeals.
5. This left the first appellant with a sense of grievance. The respondent has decided that she had acted dishonestly in support of an application. The consequence of that is that she will probably be unable to obtain a visit visa to enter the United Kingdom for a period of ten years and I was told in submissions, and accept, that it is very likely that being refused admission to United Kingdom because of deception will make it difficult or impossible for her to gain permission to visit any other country lawfully during a similar period.
6. When the First-tier Tribunal gave permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal it made it plain that "permission is granted limited to a consideration of the merits under paragraph 320(7A)". It must follow from this that permission was only granted in the case of the first appellant because hers was the only appeal that was at all concerned with paragraph 320(7A).
7. It follows that the appeals of the second, third and fourth appellants were not before me and the decisions of the First-tier Tribunal in their appeals must stand.
8. It is quite clear that Judge Reid did not consider refusal under paragraph 320(7A) beyond acknowledging that it was one of the reasons for refusal.
9. As is explained above, the appellants were each told that their right of appeal was limited to the grounds referred to in Section 84(1)(c) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. The material parts of this states that an appeal must be brought on one or more of the following grounds:
"(c) that the decision is unlawful under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 (c. 42) (public authority not to act contrary to Human Rights Convention) as being incompatible with the appellant's Convention rights;"
10. As the First-tier Tribunal decided, correctly, that the appeal could not succeed under Article 8 grounds there was no point in the judge deciding further if the application was decided rightly under paragraph 320(7A). If that decision is erroneous it is an immaterial error. There is no appeal against part of the decision.
11. It follows from this that persons aggrieved by decisions of Entry Clearance Officers under paragraph 320(7A) which can be appealed on human rights grounds should bring separate proceedings by way of judicial review if they want to challenge a decision made under paragraph 320(7A). I have not been able to imagine circumstances where a bad decision under paragraph 320(7A) would contravene the United Kingdom's obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights and no such contravention was alleged here.
12. It follows that I uphold the decision of the First-tier Tribunal. In the case of the first appellant the appeal is dismissed and in the case of the second, third and fourth appellants there is no appeal before me. The First-tier Tribunal's decision to dismiss their appeals is unchanged.
Notice of Decision
The appeal of the First Appellant is dismissed.
The other purported appellants do not have an appeal before the Upper Tribunal.


Signed

Jonathan Perkins
Judge of the Upper Tribunal

Dated 1 December 2016