The decision



Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: VA/05772/2012


THE IMMIGRATION ACTS


Heard at : Sheldon Court
Determination Promulgated
On : 13th June 2013
On : 24th May 2013




Before

Upper Tribunal Judge McKee


Between

khaled hussen

Appellant
and

Entry Clearance Officer, Dacca

Respondent


Representation:

For the Appellant: No appearance
For the Respondent: Mr Neville Smart, Senior Presenting Officer


DETERMINATION AND REASONS

1. The decision under appeal in the instant case was taken by the ECO on 28th December 2011, and not on 13th May 2011, as appears in the First-tier Tribunal’s determination. The latter date was actually given by the Entry Clearance Manager when he reviewed the decision, following the arrival of the appeal papers on 2nd April 2012. No doubt the intended date was 13th May 2012.

2. The application for a ‘family visit’ visa and the subsequent appeal are notable for the volume of documentation provided by the British Immigration Advisory Service, a firm operating in Sylhet. The application was initially refused because, although the UCB bank statements provided by Mr Hussen had a closing balance on 27th November 2011 of Taka 2,39,529/-, this figure was made up largely of recent deposits, which were not consistent with the applicant’s monthly income. Mr Hussen was said to derive additional income from his father’s land, but the documents provided did not demonstrate whether any income was derived from the land or how many members of the family were supported therefrom.

3. A bundle comprising the documents previously submitted and a number of fresh documents, such as cash memos from Emran Auto Rice Mill, was sent out with the notice of appeal, and was carefully reviewed by the Entry Clearance Manager. This review is very thorough, traversing the documents in respect of the family farm and the appellant’s two businesses, Khaled Poultry Firm and Khaled Enterprise. There is no need for me to set out the review here. I would only comment that it is very far from the perfunctory ‘rubber-stamping’ of the ECO’s decision which characterizes many of the ECM reviews which I have seen over the years. On the contrary, it is the most detailed and painstaking assessment which I have ever seen in an ECM review. With respect, it addresses the documentary evidence far more thoroughly than did the First-tier Tribunal, and gives cogent reasons for upholding the ECO’s decisions.

4. The only advantage which the First-tier Tribunal had was the attendance at the hearing on 25th July 2012 of the sponsor, Sheikh Mohammed Bashir Uddin, whose evidence is recorded rather confusingly at paragraph 12 of Judge Wilbert Harris’ determination. The pronouns ‘he’ and ‘his’ are used in such a way as to be unclear whether the appellant or the sponsor is being referred to. What Judge Harris made of the oral evidence was that the sponsor had adequate accommodation in which to put up the appellant, but that he was “not satisfied that the Sponsor intends to invite the Appellant to the United Kingdom on a visit as claimed.” This suggested to me, when the application for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal was renewed by the British Immigration Advisory Service ~ having initially been refused by Designated Judge Wilson ~ that Judge Harris thought the sponsor to be complicit in a scheme to bring the appellant to the United Kingdom for a purpose other than a genuine visit. I granted leave to appeal because of my concerns over this.

5. The ECO had not made such a suggestion. Rather, the age of the sponsor’s documents provided with the application suggested to the ECO that Mr Hussen did not have a real sponsor at all. I can see nothing in the sponsor’s evidence to support the judge’s view. I assume that the judge inferred, from his finding that the appellant did not intend a genuine visit, that the sponsor must be aware that the appellant did not intend a genuine visit. That inference, of course, does not logically follow. The sponsor did not, however, attend the hearing before me, despite notice of today’s hearing being sent to his home address in Birmingham on 22nd May.

6. A representative of the respondent did attend the hearing. Mr Smart acknowledged that the analysis and reasoning deployed by Judge Harris were brief, but asked me to find that they were adequate. He handed up a copy of Shizad (sufficiency of reasons : set aside) [2013] UKUT 85 (IAC), in which the President of our Chamber explains that the reasons for allowing or dismissing an appeal do not have to be extensive if the decision as a whole makes sense, having regard to the material accepted by the judge. In the present case, I think it can just about be said that the decision as a whole makes sense, despite the brevity of the reasons, insofar as it relates to the appellant rather than the sponsor. It certainly makes sense in the context of the Entry Clearance Manager’s review, which is of an unusually high quality.

7. At every stage of the application and appeal process, the British Immigration Advisory Service have submitted a thick bundle of documents, accompanied by prolix grounds. But quantity is not the same as quality. All in all, I can see no material error of law in the First-tier Tribunal’s determination. On the material before him, including the ECM’s review, the judge was entitled to reach the conclusion which he did.




DECISION

The appeal is dismissed.


Richard McKee
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
20th June 2013