Tribunal decisions

The decision

ASYLUM AND IMMIGRATION TRIBUNAL

SS & ors (Ankara Agreement – no in-country right of appeal) Turkey [2006] UKAIT 00074

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Heard at Field House on 22 May and 28 June 2006
Notice sent:
29 September 2006

Before
SENIOR IMMIGRATION JUDGE STOREY
SENIOR IMMIGRATION JUDGE GRUBB
IMMIGRATION JUDGE AFAKO

Between

Appellants
And
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT

Respondent

Representation:

For the first, second and fourth appellants: Mr M Chatwin, Counsel, instructed by Souleiman GA, Solicitors
For the respondent: Ms S Leatherland, Home Office Presenting Officer

(i) failed Turkish asylum-seekers who seek to rely on “standstill” provisions under the Ankara Agreement of 1963 by virtue of engaging in business or being self-employed in the UK (even assuming they have received an appealable immigration decision) do not have an in-country right of appeal under the legislative framework in place on 1 January 1973 (the relevant “standstill” provisions);

(ii) assuming they have received an appealable immigration decision, those who lodged their appeals since the coming into force of the 2002 Act but before 4 April 2005 do have an in-country right of appeal under s.92(4)(a) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 as amended if they have made an asylum or human rights claim to the Secretary of State as defined in s.113(1) of that Act;

(iii) however, those who lodged or lodge their appeals since the coming into force of the 2002 Act but on or after 4 April 2005 (as did all four appellants in this case), (even assuming they have received an appealable immigration decision) cannot have an in-country right of appeal unless they have earlier made an asylum and human rights claim to the Secretary of State when applying under the Ankara Agreement.

NOTICE UNDER RULE 9, ASYLUM AND IMMIGRATION APPEAL TRIBUNAL (PROCEDURE) RULES 2005

1. This notice deals with the cases of four appellants, all nationals of Turkey. Despite being failed asylum seekers, all claim that by virtue of engaging in business or being self-employed in the United Kingdom they are entitled to rely on the “standstill” provisions in the EC-Turkey Association Agreement (September 12, 1963) and the Additional Protocol (November 23, 1970). This is variously described in the submissions as the “EC Turkish Association Agreement” “the Turkish Association Agreement”, the Turkish ECAA”, but is referred to hereafter simply as “the Ankara Agreement”.

2. The appeals raise an important point of general application to appeals in cases concerned with provisions of the Ankara Agreement relating to persons engaged in business or who are self-employed, in particular whether any appeal may be brought in-country.

3. There were originally three other appellants. Their appeals had been listed together with the four which now concern us at Taylor House on 29 March 2006 before two members of the current panel. The appeals of these three other appellants no longer concern us as in each case the Secretary of State had sent a letter to the Tribunal stating that the decision under appeal had been withdrawn and the Tribunal then served notice under rule 17(3) of the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal (Procedure) Rules 2005 (SI 2005/230) (hereafter “the 2005 Procedure Rules”) recording the appeal as having been withdrawn.

4. The initial hearing at Taylor House before two members of the current panel was devoted to hearing argument on the issue of whether the seven appellants had an in-country right of appeal. It was accepted that only if we found they did have an in-country right of appeal could their appeals be considered substantively. Both the Presenting Officer appearing on that occasion (Ms Pal) and the appellants’ representative, Mr Chatwin, argued that there was an in-country right of appeal, but both accepted that this was a matter of law properly to be determined by the Tribunal. Shortly after that hearing the parties were notified that there would be a further hearing of a selection of the seven cases. They were also told that the panel’s decision on the preliminary issue was that there is an in-country right of appeal in each of the seven cases. However, that decision, being on a preliminary issue, remains subject to determination by the present panel of the cases concerned, which in any event are now reduced to four.

5. Shortly after the Taylor House hearing, the Tribunal’s attention was drawn to a recent Administrative Court judgment by Sullivan J: R(Mehmet Parmak) [2006] EWHC 244 (Admin) dated 13 February 2006 deciding that there was no “in-country” right of appeal in respect of a national of Turkey who had arrived in the UK via Dover in August 1999 and whose application for asylum and subsequent appeals had been rejected but who had then made an application for leave to enter in July 2005 on the basis of the Ankara Agreement. As this had not been cited before the panel (despite Mr Chatwin being Counsel in Mehmet Parmak), the panel wrote inviting the parties to make submissions as to its relevance. The panel received relatively brief replies, which we have taken into account in our subsequent analysis.

6. At the outset of the first day of hearing before us, we heard further submissions on whether there could be an in-country right of appeal in these cases and we specifically asked the parties to address us on one particular matter troubling us in light of the fact that each of the appeals before us had been lodged after 4 April 2005, when the new Asylum and Immigration Tribunal came into being. In the event we have changed our view on the issue of whether there is an in-country right of appeal in cases like those before us.

7. Still on the procedural history of these appeals, we should also mention that following a further memorandum sent to the parties on 16 May 2006 one further case was added to the list of those we were to hear, but that, by the time of our second day of hearing on 28 June 2006, the decision in respect of that person’s case had been withdrawn and so his case too was the subject of a notice from the Tribunal recording the decision as having been withdrawn.

The appellants’ immigration history

8. All four appellants arrived in the UK on various dates between February 2000 and 2003 and claimed asylum at port. All were either granted temporary admission or detained and subsequently released on bail or temporary release. All were refused asylum. All lost their subsequent appeals which they had brought or argued on asylum and human rights grounds. Some time – in all four cases, some considerable time - after exhausting their appeal rights, all made an application for leave to enter or remain on the basis that they were either businessmen or self-employed persons who stood to benefit from the Ankara Agreement.

9. Through his officials, the Secretary of State refused their applications by letters (respectively dated 14 November 2005, 19 September 2005, 13 February 2006 and 13 January 2006). None of the letters setting out the terms of the refusal describe the latter as an appealable decision. One indeed specified that there could be no in-country right of appeal by virtue of the fact that s.92 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (hereafter the “2002 Act”) “did not apply”. However, in the case of the first appellant a “Notice of Decision” dated 14 November 2005 and refusing him leave to enter was issued and signed “on behalf of the Secretary of State”. It indicated that any appeal must be brought out of country. (What appears to be an identical notice dated 21 March 2006 was also subsequently served on him.) Subsequently, in respect of the second, third and fourth appellants the Secretary of State set directions on 9 March 2006, 8 March 2006 and 3 March 2006 respectively for their removal to Turkey as illegal entrants/immigration offenders. (It is not clear to us why they were treated as illegal entrants/immigration offenders since all were refused leave to enter at port; however, this is not a matter of importance to the outcome of these appeals.)

10. In each case those acting for the appellants lodged a notice of appeal with the Tribunal against the decision to refuse the application under the Ankara Agreement. There were initially issues as to the timeliness of the notices of appeal to the Tribunal, but these were resolved by an Immigration Judge in the appellants’ favour and do not concern us here. The grounds raised in those notices all relied on provisions of the Ankara Agreement. In all but the first appellant’s case they also relied on human rights (Article 8 and Article 1 Protocol 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights).

11. In the second appellant’s case the relevant parts of the letter sent with the grounds stated as follows:

“In accordance with s.84, the appellant seeks to rely on the following grounds:

that removal would be unlawful under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 as being incompatible with his Convention rights;
that the decision is not in accordance with the immigration rules (HC509);
that the decision is not otherwise in accordance with the law (Community law, as given effect under the terms of the Turkish ECAA).

Briefly, the reasons for those grounds …are:

- the appellant has established a private life (Article 8 ECHR) in the United Kingdom by virtue of his business interests, and has property the enjoyment of which would be interfered with (Article 1, Protocol 1);

- the terms of HC509 paragraphs 30 to 32 are met in his case;

- the appellant has a right to an effective remedy against refusal, under Community law because this is an application the entitlement to which arises by virtue of the EC Association Agreement.”

12. There was a letter drafted in very similar terms in the third and fourth appellants’ cases.

The Ankara Agreement

13. The Ankara Agreement has been the subject of a recent reported decision of the Tribunal: OY (Ankara Agreement; standstill clause; worker’s family) Turkey [2006] UKAIT 00028. However, since that decision’s principal focus concerned Turkish workers, not Turkish nationals relying on establishment in the form of business or self-employed activities, we need to highlight provisions of this Agreement affecting the latter category.

14. Article 2(1) of the Agreement states that the aim of the treaty is to promote the continuous and balanced strengthening of trade and economic relations between the contracting parties. In relation to the work force, this includes the progressive securing of freedom of movement for workers. Workers' rights are dealt with in Article 12. Article 13 deals with the abolition of restrictions on freedom of establishment. Article 14 deals with the freedom to provide services. Collectively these provisions seek to improve the standard of living of the Turkish people and facilitate the accession of Turkey to the Community at a later date (fourth recital in the preamble and Article 28).

15. Article 1 of the Protocol states that it lays down the conditions, arrangements and timetables for implementing the transitional stage referred to in Article 4 of the Agreement. The Protocol includes Title II, headed "Movement of Persons and Services", chapter I of which concerns "Workers" and Chapter II of which covers "Rights of establishment, services and transport". Article 36 of the Protocol, which is in Chapter I, states:
"Freedom of movement for workers between Member States of the Community and Turkey shall be secured by progressive stages in accordance with the principles set out in Article 12 of the Agreement of Association between the end of the twelfth and the twenty-second year after the entry into force of that Agreement.
The Council of Association [a joint EC-Turkey body] shall decide on the rules necessary to that end."
16. Article 41 of the Protocol comes in Chapter II. As we have seen, it is headed "Rights of establishment, services and transport” and it provides:
"1. The Contracting Parties shall refrain from introducing between themselves any new restrictions on the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services.
2. The Council of Association shall, in accordance with the principles set out in Articles 13 and 14 of the Agreement of Association, determine the timetable and rules for the progressive abolition by the Contracting Parties, between themselves, of restrictions on freedom of establishment and on freedom to provide services.
3. The Council of Association shall, when determining such timetable and rules for the various classes of activity, take into account corresponding measures already adopted by the Community in these fields and also the special economic and social circumstances of Turkey. Priority shall be given to activities making a particular contribution to the development of production and trade."
17. It is noteworthy that the Council of Association has never adopted any measures under Article 41(2) of the Protocol. By contrast, in the field of workers (as opposed to those wishing to establish businesses), various formal decisions have been made by the Council to secure rights of freedom of movement for Turkish nationals within the Member States.

18. In C-37/98 Savas [2000] ECR 1-2927 the European Court of Justice was concerned with the interpretation of Article 13 of the Ankara Agreement, which provides:
"The Contracting Parties agree to be guided by Articles 52 and 56 and Article 58 of the Treaty establishing the Community for the purpose of abolishing restrictions on freedom of establishment between them."
19. The Court concluded that Article 13 is no more capable than is Article 41(2) of the Additional Protocol, also referred to by the national court, of directly governing the legal position of individuals and cannot therefore have direct effect.

20. The Court, however, took a different view of the direct effect of Article 41(1) of the Additional Protocol, saying:
"46. As its very wording shows, this provision lays down, clearly, precisely and unconditionally, an unequivocal 'standstill' clause, prohibiting the contracting parties from introducing new restrictions on the freedom of establishment as from the date of entry into force of the Additional Protocol.
…
54. It follows from the considerations set forth above that Article 41(1) of the Additional Protocol lays down a precise and unconditional principle that is sufficiently operational to be applied by a national court and therefore capable of governing the legal position of individuals. The direct effect which must therefore be accorded to that provision implies that the individuals to which it applies have the right to rely on it before the courts of Member States.
…
69. It should also be noted that the 'standstill' clause in Article 41(1) of the Additional Protocol precludes a Member State from adopting any new measure having the object or effect of making the establishment, and, as a corollary, the residences of a Turkish national in its territory subject to stricter conditions than those which applied at the time when the Additional Protocol entered into force with regard to the Member State concerned.
It is therefore for the national court, which alone has jurisdiction to interpret its own domestic law, to determine whether the domestic rules applied to Mr Savas by the competent authorities have the effect of worsening his position in comparison with the rules which were applicable in the United Kingdom on the date on which the Additional Protocol entered into force in relation to that Member State."
21. Accordingly, the Court held that Article 41(1) of the Additional Protocol has direct effect in Member States:
"Article 41(1) of the Additional Protocol is not in itself capable of conferring upon a Turkish national a right of establishment and, as a corollary, a right of residence in the Member State in whose territory he has remained and carried on business activities as a self-employed person in breach of the domestic immigration law.
However, Article 41(1) of the Additional Protocol prohibits the introduction of new national restrictions on the freedom of establishment and right of residence of Turkish nationals as from the date on which that protocol entered into force in the host Member State. It is for the national court to interpret domestic law for the purposes of determining whether the rules applied to the applicant in the main proceedings are less favourable than those which were applicable at the time when the Additional Protocol entered into force."
22. The implications of the ECJ's decision in Savas were considered by the Court of Appeal in R (Tum and Dari) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] EWCA Civ 788; [2004] CMLR 48, 1131. The claimants were Turkish nationals. Like the appellants with whom we are concerned, they had sought asylum and had been granted temporary admission. Their asylum applications were unsuccessful. They faced removal to Germany and France respectively. Whilst here on temporary admission, Mr Dari had started a business. Mr Tum was said to be in the process of starting one. Both applied for leave to enter under the Agreement. They did not comply with the current immigration rules (HC395), as, apart from any other considerations, they did not have prior entry clearance. The claimants argued nevertheless that their applications should have been considered by the Secretary of State under the Immigration Rules (HC509) which were in force on 1st January 1973 and which (so they said) did not require prior entry clearance in every case.

23. With reference to the ECJ's judgment in Savas, Lord Woolf CJ stated in paragraphs [21] to [23] in their relevant parts:
"21… it is submitted by Mr Saini [on behalf of the Secretary of State] that those who have attempted to obtain admission to this country as asylum seekers but who have had their asylum claim rejected cannot rely upon the provisions of Art.41(1) of the Additional Protocol.
22. Davis J [at the Administrative Court stage] rejected that argument, and so do I. There is nothing in Art.41 (1) of the Additional Protocol itself to support that argument. Furthermore, when the judgment in Savas is properly understood as falling into two clear parts, then it seems to me that the judgment strongly supports the contention of the respondents. The fact that the 'standstill' provisions are to apply to a person whatever his status so far as his right to remain in this country or his right to enter this country are concerned, is covered by the 'standstill' provisions.
23. The one exception that I would make to that clear position is with regard to a person who achieves entry to this country by the use of fraud. It has long been the situation that those who enter by fraud cannot benefit from the point of view of immigration status by so doing..."
24. Earlier at paragraph [16] Lord Woolf had noted that:

“Claims for asylum may be bona fide claims, albeit that they are unsuccessful”

25. We understand from Sullivan J’s discussion of this case in Mehmet Parmak that the Secretary of State petitioned the House of Lords for leave to appeal against the Court of Appeal's judgment in Tum and Dari and the House of Lords has referred various questions to the ECJ. Pending a ruling on those questions, the Secretary of State has adopted the approach of considering applications from persons in the claimants' position under both the current Immigration Rules and the rules as they applied in 1973.

The current immigration rules

26. The current Immigration Rules, HC395 as amended, deal with persons seeking to enter or remain in the UK as a businessman, self-employed person, investor, writer, composer or artist in Part 6 at paragraphs 200-245. Paragraph 4 states that these rules came into effect on 1 October 1994 and:

“will apply to all decisions taken on or after that date save that any application made before 1 October 1994 for entry clearance, leave to enter or remain or variation of leave to enter or remain [other than an application for leave by a person seeking asylum,] shall be decided under the provisions of HC 251, as amended, if these Rules had not been made.”

The 1973 immigration rules

27. The relevant Immigration Rules on 1 January 1973 were contained in HC509 and HC510. The former dealt with control on entry, the latter with control after entry. Paragraph 30 of HC509 states:
"30. Passengers who have obtained entry clearance for the purpose of establishing themselves in the United Kingdom in business, whether a new or existing business, should be admitted for a period not exceeding 12 months with a condition restricting their freedom to take employment. Passengers who are unable to present such a clearance but nevertheless seem likely to be able to satisfy the requirements of one of the next 2 paragraphs should be admitted for a period of not more than 2 months, with a prohibition on employment, and advised to present their case to the Home Office."
28. Paragraphs 31 and 32 of HC509 set out the various requirements if an applicant is joining an established business: that he bring money of his own; that he be able to bear his share of liabilities etc; that if wishing to establish a business on his own account he can show he will be bringing sufficient funds to establish the business and that the business can realistically be expected to support him and any dependants without recourse to employment, for which a work permit is required.

29. In HC510 (which deal with control after-entry) the relevant paragraph is paragraph 21 which states:
“People admitted as visitors may apply for the consent of the Secretary of State to their establishing themselves here for the purpose of setting up in business, whether on their own account or as partners in a new or existing business. Any such application is to be considered on merits. Permission will depend on a number of factors, including evidence that the applicant will be devoting assets of his own to the business, proportional to his interest in it, that he will be able to bear his share of any liabilities the business may incur, and that his share of its profits will be sufficient to support him and any dependants. The applicant’s part in the business must not amount to disguised employment, and it must be clear that he will not have to supplement his business activities by employment for which a work permit is required. Where the applicant intends to join an existing business, audited accounts should be produced to establish its financial position, together with a written statement of the terms on which he is to enter into it; evidence should be sought that he will be actively concerned with its running and that there is a genuine need for his services and investment. Where the application is granted the applicant’s stay may be extended for a period of up to 12 months, on a condition restricting his freedom to take employment. A person admitted as a businessman in the first instance may be granted an appropriate extension of stay if the conditions set out above are still satisfied at the end of the period for which he was admitted initially. “
30. The way in which the respondent approaches Turkish applicants by considering their applications under both new and old immigration rules is well illustrated by the particulars of the cases before us, to which we now turn.
The appellants

Appellant 1
31. We do not have many details of this appellant’s history, except that he entered the UK on 7 February 2001, but it is said by Mr Chatwin that he made an asylum application at port and was granted temporary admission and that, when this was refused, his subsequent appeal attempts all failed. At some later point in time he applied for leave to enter or remain under the Ankara Agreement on the basis of his fried chicken business. A notice of decision refusing him leave to enter was served on 14 November 2005 that refusal being confirmed on review on 22 December 2005. The refusal letter made reference to paragraph 205 of HC395 as amended and paragraphs 30, 31, and 32 of HC509. The appellant appealed on 14 March 2006. His grounds of appeal relate solely to the Ankara Agreement. What appears to be a notice of decision identical to that served on 14 November 2005 but dated 21 March 2006 was also subsequently served on the first appellant.

Appellant 2
32. The second appellant arrived in the UK on 28 April 2003, claimed asylum at the port and was granted temporary admission. We have not been shown any details but Mr Chatwin confirmed that his asylum claim had been rejected and his appeal had been unsuccessful. On 18 May 2005 he applied for leave to enter as a self-employed businessperson (chef) under HC509 by virtue of the terms of the Ankara Agreement. On 19 September 2005 the respondent refused his application under paragraph 205 of HC395 as amended and paragraphs 30, 31 and 32 of HC509. On 9 March 2006 the respondent issued notice of directions to remove the appellant as an illegal entrant/immigration offender. On 15 March the appellant appealed, contending that he had an in-country right of appeal. The grounds raised, inter alia, human rights.

Appellant 3
33. The third appellant arrived on 2 April 2001. Again we lack details, but Mr Chatwin was able to confirm that he had claimed asylum at port and had been granted temporary admission. His asylum application was rejected and he failed in his subsequent attempts to appeal on asylum and human rights grounds. On 28 April 2005 he applied under the Ankara Agreement. In a letter of 13 February 2006 the respondent refused his application for leave to remain under paragraph 208 with reference to 206(i) of HC395 as amended. Reference was also made, on a “without prejudice” basis, to paragraphs 4 [setting out “General considerations”] and 21 of HC510. He was issued with a notice of removal directions as an illegal entrant/immigration offender on 8 March 2006. He appealed on 17 March 2006 raising, inter alia, human rights grounds.

Appellant 4
34. The fourth appellant arrived in the UK on 3 February 2000. He claimed asylum at port, he was granted temporary admission. When his asylum application was refused, his subsequent appeal was unsuccessful. On 30 September 2004 his solicitors applied for “an extension of stay” in the UK under the Ankara Agreement. On 17 February 2006 he was served with notice of directions to remove him as an illegal entrant/immigration offender. On 27 February 2006 the respondent refused his application based on the Ankara Agreement under paragraph 205 of HC395 as amended and paragraphs 30, 31 and 32 of HC509. His appeal, lodged on 14 March 2006, raised, inter alia, human rights grounds.

The appealable decision issue

35. At the adjourned hearing, a further issue arose. The respondent submitted that in none of the cases had an appealable “immigration decision” been made which could give rise to an appeal.

36. First, it was said by the respondent that the “refusal letters” did not constitute “immigration decisions” within s. 82 of the 2002 Act. In each case, on the basis of the Ankara Agreement, the appellant sought leave to enter as all had claimed asylum at port and had been granted ‘temporary admission’ at some point. The refusal letters refer explicitly to the applications and purport to refuse those applications. Consequently, we are content to assume that the letters are what they purport to be – decisions to refuse leave to enter and thus fall within s. 82(2)(a) of the 2002 Act.

37. Secondly, it was said that a service of a notice of decision under the Immigration (Notices) Regulations 2003 (SI 2003/658) was a prerequisite to a valid appeal. Only the first appellant had been served with a notice refusing the leave sought. There could be no appeals, therefore, in the cases of the other appellants. In response Mr Chatwin submitted that the letters themselves constitute the appealable “immigration decision”. He submitted that, having taken the decision, the decision-maker is under an obligation, if it is an appealable immigration decision, to comply with the requirements of service of a notice of that decision. It is not, however, a necessary requirement for a valid appeal. An appellant who is notified of a decision through a refusal letter may, if he wishes, lodge an appeal and waive any requirement for the decision-maker to serve a notice of decision. That, he says, is what the appellants have done in these appeals. Although, the matter is not free from doubt, we accept for the purposes of these appeals that the requirements of the Notices Regulations may be waived in their entirety by proper service of a notice of appeal.

38. Thirdly, it was said on behalf of the Secretary of State that the notice of decision served on the first appellant and each of the refusal letters (if amounting to an immigration decision) were invalid as they had been signed “on behalf of the Secretary of State” when only an immigration officer could lawfully make a decision to grant or refuse leave to enter.

39. Section 4 of the Immigration Act 1971 states so far as relevant:

“The power under this Act to give or refuse leave to enter the United Kingdom shall be exercised by immigration officers, and the power to give leave to remain in the United Kingdom, or to vary any leave under section 3(3)(a) (whether as regards duration or conditions), shall be exercised by the Secretary of State; and, unless otherwise allowed by or under this Act, those powers shall be exercised by notice in writing given to the person affected, except that the powers under section 3(3)(a) may be exercised generally in respect of any class of persons by order made by statutory instrument.”

40. It was accepted by the parties that s. 4 vested the power to give or refuse leave to enter the UK in immigration officers and not the Secretary of State. Despite Mr Chatwin’s submission to the contrary, it is clear that these decisions were not signed by an immigration officer. At the hearing, we drew the parties’ attention to s. 3A of the 1971 Act which modifies the position and in s. 3A(7) provides that:

“The Secretary of State may, in such circumstances as may be prescribed in an order made by him, give or refuse leave to enter the United Kingdom.”

41. In pursuance of that, the Immigration (Leave to Enter) Order 2001 (SI 2001/2590) empowers the Secretary of State to give or refuse leave to enter in certain circumstances. The relevant provisions are to be found in Article 2:
“2. - (1) Where this article applies to a person, the Secretary of State may give or refuse him leave to enter the United Kingdom.

    (2) This article applies to a person who seeks leave to enter the United Kingdom and who -
(a) has made a claim for asylum; or

(b) has made a claim that it would be contrary to the United Kingdom's obligations under the Human Rights Convention for him to be removed from, or required to leave, the United Kingdom.
    (3) This article also applies to a person who seeks leave to enter the United Kingdom for a purpose not covered by the immigration rules or otherwise on the grounds that those rules should be departed from in his case.

    (4) In deciding whether to give or refuse leave under this article the Secretary of State may take into account any additional grounds which a person has for seeking leave to enter the United Kingdom.

    (5) The power to give or refuse leave to enter the United Kingdom under this article shall be exercised by notice in writing to the person affected or in such manner as is permitted.”

42. Neither party placed direct reliance upon the 2001 Order. Specifically, it was not contended that article 2(2) applied here on the basis that the appellants had made an asylum or human rights claim. In the absence of argument, it would be wrong for us to reach a concluded view the scope of the 2001 Order. However, it does seem to us that article 2(3) may well apply in these appeals. By virtue of the standstill clause in the Ankara Agreement the appellants are entitled to have their applications assessed on a basis no more onerous than the criteria in HC 509 and 510. Consequently, the Secretary of State is being asked, and is required, to consider the appellants’ applications by departing from the applicable immigration rules, namely paragraphs 200-210 of HC 395 which deal with applications for leave to enter on the basis of self-employment or business.

43. The submissions we heard have left us in no doubt that difficult legal issues arise in Ankara Agreement cases in determining whether typically there will exist an immigration decision which can give rise to an appeal to the Tribunal. In the absence of full argument, we have reached no concluded view. In the result, it is not necessary for us to resolve the arguments as we have decided that, in any event, none of these appellants could have a valid in-country right of appeal against such a decision. Thus, for the purposes of this determination, we are content to assume in the appellants’ favour that the 2001 Order applied and that the Secretary of State, or his official acting on his behalf by virtue of the “Carltona principle” (Carltona Ltd v Commissioner of Works [1943] 2 All ER 560) was entitled to make the decision to refuse leave to enter in respect of each of the appellants.

44. We turn then to consider whether, on the assumption that appealable immigration decisions have been made, these appeals are properly brought in-country.

In-country right of appeal

The applicable legal framework

45. Much of the applicable legal framework is set out by the Tribunal in the reported case, SA (in-country appeal; human rights; other grounds) Bangladesh [2005] UKAIT 00178. At paragraph [6] it stated that “Part 5 of the 2002 Act governs appeals to the AIT. For these purposes the important provisions are to be found in sections 82, 84 and 92.” The Tribunal explained the logical framework provided by Parliament in Part 5 of the 2002 Act in the following terms (at para [14]):
“… Sections 82, 84 and 92 of the Act address discrete issues governing appeals to the AIT: (1) defining what decisions are appealable (s 82); (2) stating the grounds upon which such an immigration decision may be challenged (s 84); and (3) defining whether or not that appeal may be brought whilst the individual is in the UK (s 92). Each section has a distinct role in governing appeals to the AIT. The sections must, of course, be read cumulatively but they function separately.”
46. At paragraph [7] the Tribunal stated:
“We begin with section 82(1) which states:
"(1) Where an immigration decision is made in respect of a person he may appeal to the Tribunal."
Subsection (2), paragraphs (a)-(k) then sets out the "immigration decisions" which may be appealed to the AIT. (Although not relevant to this appeal, there is also the so-called 'upgrade appeal' on asylum grounds only in section 83 and appeals against EEA decisions falling within the Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2000, SI 2000/2326 [now, since 30 April 2006, the Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2006, SI 2006/1003]).
Section 84 sets out a number of grounds – (a) to (g) – upon which an appeal against an immigration decision falling within section 82 must be brought. So far as relevant to this appeal, section 84(1) provides:
"(1) An appeal under section 82(1) against an immigration decision must be brought on one or more of the following grounds – ...
(e) that the decision is otherwise not in accordance with the law; ...
(g) that removal of the appellant from the United Kingdom in consequence of the immigration decision would breach the United Kingdom's obligations under the Refugee Convention or would be unlawful under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 as being incompatible with the appellant's Convention rights. ...".
What sections 82 and 84 do not indicate is whether an appellant's appeal may be brought whilst he is in the UK or only after he has left. That issue is determined by section 92… which, so far as it is relevant to this appeal, provides as follows:
92. Appeal from within United Kingdom: general
(1) A person may not appeal under section 82(1) while he is in the United Kingdom unless his appeal is of a kind to which this section applies.
(2) This section applies to an appeal against an immigration decision of a kind specified in section 82(2) (c), (d), (e), (f) and (j)….
(4) This section also applies to an appeal against an immigration decision if the appellant –
(a) has made an asylum claim, or human rights claim, while in the United Kingdom, or
(b) is an EEA national or a member of the family of an EEA national and makes a claim to the Secretary of State that the decision breaches the appellant's rights under the Community Treaties in respect of entry to or residence in the United Kingdom."
47. The Tribunal in SA saw the way in which s.92 comes into play as being thus:

“11. The wording of section 92 is plain: a person may not appeal against an “immigration decision” under the 2002 Act whilst in the United Kingdom unless section 92 applies. By virtue of section 92(2) certain immigration decisions are always appealable from within the UK (subject to certification on a ‘clearly unfounded’ basis under section 94). These are decisions: to refuse a certificate of entitlement, to refuse to extend leave, to curtail existing leave, to revoke indefinite leave to remain and to make a deportation order (s82(2)(c), (d), (e), (f) and (j) respectively). Other decisions falling within section 82(2) may only be appealed from within the UK if the appellant has made an ‘asylum claim’ or ‘human rights claim’ as defined in section 113 (s92(4)(a)), or where he makes a claim relying on his EU rights as an EEA national or family member (s92(4)(b)). Removal decisions against illegal entrants and overstayers or their families fall within this latter category of decisions. ”

48. Having set out the applicable legal framework, we need to consider existing judicial guidance on the in-country right of appeal issue.
49. In the Court of Appeal decision in Tum and Dari, as we have seen, the applicants had argued that if considered under the law and immigration rules as they stood on 1 January 1973, they had an in-country right of appeal. The Court of Appeal did not decide that point. Its judgment was confined to deciding that, except in cases of fraud, even nationals of Turkey who have no lawful basis for their presence in the UK, stand to have any application they make under the Ankara Agreement considered on the basis of the “standstill” clause contained in that treaty, so that it is considered under national law provisions in force on 1 January 1973. (Lord Woolf made clear at paragraphs [16] that fraud could not be established simply because a person had made a claim for asylum that was unsuccessful: “[c]laims for asylum may be bona fide claims, albeit that they are unsuccessful”. We say no more here about the “fraud exception” as none of the appeals before us turn on this point, but see: R(Taskale) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] EWHC 712 (Admin), R(Aksu) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] EWHC 1382 (Admin) , R(Ilyas Semsek) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] EWHC 1486 (Admin), R(Aysel Aslan) [2006] EWHC 1855 (Admin) and R(Ali Aslan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] EWHC 1877 (Admin).
50. However, in Mehmet Parmak the in-country right of appeal issue was addressed directly. Sullivan J held that, even applying (on Tum and Dari principles) the “standstill” provisions to nationals of Turkey who came to the UK in order to claim asylum, i.e. by considering them under the body of immigration law and rules as it stood on 1 January 1973, such persons would not have an in-country right of appeal. This is how he disposed of the matter in paragraphs [14]-[16]:
“14. The position in 1973
In the claimant's skeleton argument it was conceded that, under domestic legislation as it stood in 1973 (and setting aside any argument based on Community law), while a claimant on temporary admission who was refused leave to enter would have had a right of appeal under Section 13(1) of the Immigration Act 1971 by virtue of subsection 13(3):
(1)"... a person shall not be entitled to appeal against a refusal of leave to enter so long as he is in the United Kingdom, unless he was refused leave at a port of entry and at a time when he held a current entry clearance or was a person named in a current work permit."
Thus, it is common ground that in 1973 the claimant, who did not have current entry clearance and was not a person named in a current work permit, would have had an out-of-country right of appeal to an adjudicator against the refusal of leave to enter”.
51. In paragraph [24] Sullivan J concluded that he was “satisfied that the claimant is not entitled to an in-country right of appeal by virtue of the operation of the standstill agreement”. We agree.
52. We should perhaps add that later on in his judgment Sullivan J recognised that the immigration rules in force on January 1973 did allow, in at least one place, for persons to be “admitted” to the UK without entry clearance: he cited, inter alia, paragraph 30 of HC509. We have cited this earlier, but for convenience do so again here:
"30. Passengers who have obtained entry clearance for the purpose of establishing themselves in the United Kingdom in business, whether a new or existing business, should be admitted for a period not exceeding 12 months with a condition restricting their freedom to take employment. Passengers who are unable to present such a clearance but nevertheless seem likely to be able to satisfy the requirements of one of the next 2 paragraphs should be admitted for a period of not more than 2 months, with a prohibition on employment, and advised to present their case to the Home Office.(emphasis added).”
53. The requirements of the next two paragraphs, paragraphs 31 and 32, as already noted, specify, inter alia: that if an applicant is joining an established business he bring money of his own and be able to bear his share of liabilities etc. They further specify that if an applicant if wishing to establish a business on his own account he must be able to show he will be bringing sufficient funds to establish the business and that the business can realistically be expected to support him and any dependants without recourse to employment, for which a work permit is required.
54. However, as Sullivan J pointed out, the fact that under HC509 there could be persons able to be admitted without entry clearance was of purely academic interest in the context of the type of appeal before him, since:
“31. … it is common ground that the claimant did not seek to enter this country in order to set up a business. He entered plainly to be a refugee. He was granted temporary admission. When his refugee claim failed, and whilst he was still temporarily admitted to this country but had not been given leave to enter, he sought leave to enter upon the basis of the Agreement. In 1973 an applicant in such a position would have had an out-of-country right of appeal but not a right to an in-country appeal.”
55. For the very same reasons none of the appellants in the cases with which we are concerned can benefit from any 1973 provisions waiving entry clearance as a requirement: they too are all persons who entered claiming to be refugees; they too did not seek to enter the UK in order to set up a business or be self-employed, nor had they been admitted as visitors.
56. En route to concluding that Mehmet Parmak could not have an in-country right of appeal, Sullivan J addressed a further argument raised by Mr Chatwin which was that, by analogy with the ECJ’s approach to the rights of workers under Article 12 of the Agreement (which is in similar terms to Article 13), procedural safeguards should be conferred upon the claimant: Mr Chatwin had prayed in aid the ECJ case of C-136/03 Dorr and Unal. Whilst prepared to accept by reference to this case that procedural safeguards could “piggyback” on an individual’s substantive rights, Sullivan J concluded that this did not help Mr Mehmet Parmak because the only directly effective right conferred by the Ankara Agreement on Turkish business or self-employed persons was that they were entitled to rely upon the standstill clause in Art 41(1) of the Additional Protocol. In our view Sullivan J’s reasoning here is also sufficient to dispose of the ground of appeal raised in the appeals of the second, third and fourth appellants before us, that they have a right to an effective remedy against the refusals under Community law.
57. However, in the course of dealing with this additional submission, Sullivan J stated at paragraph [22]:
“Thus, his position must be no worse than it would have been under the rules which were applicable on 1st January 1973; see paragraph 70 of the ECJ's judgment in Savas and paragraphs 20 to 22 of the Court of Appeal's judgment in Tum and Dari. If he would not have been entitled to an in-country right of appeal under the immigration legislation then in force, there is no reason why he should be entitled to such a right in 2006.” (emphasis added).
58. Of course, Sullivan J was only referring to the “standstill clause”-based argument that the Ankara Agreement conferred, by its effect, an in-country right of appeal under the rules which were applicable in 1973. He was not faced with the arguments raised before us. It seems to us that whether there is an in-country right of appeal under the current legislative framework of the 2002 Act is an entirely separate matter from whether there was one in 1973. It is not a matter, in our view, which can be properly resolved without analysing the current legislative framework, in the light of the arguments which have been advanced before us. This is what we now proceed to do.
The issue of whether the appellants have an in-country right of appeal under current legislation
59. For the appellants in this case to have an in-country right of appeal they must show three things.
60. First, their appeal must be in respect of an immigration decision as defined in s.82 of the 2002 Act.
61. Second, it must be either an immigration decision of the kind specified in s.92(2); or it must involve an appeal against an immigration decision in which the appellant can come within s.92(4) by showing that he has:
“(a) made an asylum claim, or a human rights claim, while in the United Kingdom, or
(b) is an EEA national or a member of the family of an EEA national and makes a claim to the Secretary of State that the decision breaches the appellant’s rights under the Community Treaties in respect of entry or residence in of entry to or residence in the United Kingdom”.
62. Third, by virtue of the definition of an “asylum claim” and “human rights claim” given in s.113(1) of the 2002 Act, they have to show that their claim is one “made…to the Secretary of State…”. Section 113 (Interpretation) contains the following definition of “asylum claim” and “human rights claim”:
“In this Part (Part 5), unless a contrary intention appears–
“asylum claim” means a claim made by a person to the Secretary of State at a place designated by the Secretary of State that to remove the person from or require him to leave the United Kingdom would breach the United Kingdom’s obligations under the Refugee Convention, …
“human rights claim” means a claim made by a person to the Secretary of State at a place designated by the Secretary of State that to remove the person from or require him to leave the United Kingdom would be unlawful under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 (c.42) (public authorities not to act contrary to Convention) as being incompatible with his Convention rights, …”.
Section 82(1)
63. As regards the first requirement, as we indicated earlier, for the purposes of these appeals we are prepared to assume that there are appealable decisions in each of the four appeals before us.
Section 92(2)
64. We turn thus to the first limb of the second requirement. Plainly too, none of the decisions involved were ones which came within the scope of s. 92(2). That is to say, none involved an immigration decision of a kind specified in s. 82(2)(c), (e), (f) and (j).
Section 92(4)(b)
65. If the second requirement is to be met, therefore, it will have to be shown that the appellants can benefit from s.92(4)(a) or (b). Mr Chatwin further accepted that none of the appellants in this case could rely on s. 94(4)b), as none were EEA nationals or members of the family of an EEA national. Since the Ankara Agreement was struck precisely because nationals of Turkey were not EEA nationals but were (and remain), rather, would-be EEA nationals, that may seem obvious enough. We mention this, however, because in written submissions prior to the hearing those instructing Mr Chatwin had sought to rely on an unreported determination by an Immigration Judge sitting at Hatton Cross (Mr C N Lane) on Appeal No. IA/00061/2006, in which he appeared to decide that a national of Turkey in a similar position to these appellants had an in-country right of appeal by virtue of s.92(4)(b). Since no attempt had been made to comply with AIT Practice Directions dealing with citation of unreported cases, we would not have considered this case anyway, but for completeness we record that in our view it overlooks that Turkish nationals are not EEA nationals.
66. Our conclusion on this matter takes into account the possible argument which could be brought relying on s.109 of the 2002 Act and the relevant regulations made under s.109(1), namely the Immigration (EEA) Regulations 2006 SI/1003 (hereafter the “2006 Regulations”). Granted, s.109 of the 2002 Act states that regulations may provide for an appeal against an immigration decision taken in respect of a person who has or claims to have a right under any of the Community Treaties. But the 2006 Regulations (which also apply to past decisions) do not provide for such an appeal in respect of Turkish nationals under the Ankara Agreement (Nor did their predecessor, the Immigration (EEA) Regulations 2000). Such persons do not come within the personal scope of these Regulations. Regulation 26 confines appeal rights against “an EEA decision” to persons claiming to be an EEA national or the family member or relative of an EEA national. Regulation 2 defines “EEA decision” to mean “a decision under these Regulations …” (emphasis added). The 2006 Regulations cover only Community (now Union) legislation regarding free movement of persons and implement Directive 2004/38/EC, which is concerned solely with the rights of citizens of the Union (together with nationals of an “EEA State”, namely Norway, Iceland, Lichenstein and Switzerland: see Regulation 2) and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States. Furthermore, s.84(1)(d) of the 2002 Act confines reliance on breaches of Community Treaties (as a ground of appeal against an immigration decision) to appellants who are “an EEA national or a member of the family of an EEA national”.
Section 92(4)(a)
67. That brings us to the appellants’ last basis for meeting the second requirement we have identified, namely showing they can benefit from s.92(4)(a).
68. Mr Chatwin sought to argue that the appellants could bring themselves within s.94(4)(a) by virtue of the fact that each of them had made a human rights claim. The human rights claim he identified was an allegedly disproportionate interference with each appellant’s right to respect for private life and right to enjoy possessions. These rights were said to encompass, or be encompassed by, the fact firstly that they were in business or were self-employed and so were engaged in activities which came within the concept of “private life” under Art 8 (he cited the European Court of Human Rights judgment in Niemietz v Germany (1992) 16 EHRR 97); and secondly by the fact that each had property within the meaning of Art 1 of Protocol No. 1 of the ECHR.
69. Mr Chatwin conceded that the appellants in this case could not bring themselves within s.94(4)(a) purely because they had made asylum and human rights claims (so identified) in the context of their (much) earlier, unsuccessful, asylum appeals, all of which had been finally determined. His submissions were confined to arguing that the appellants had satisfied s.92(4)(a) by having made a human rights claim at the time of making their applications under the Ankara Agreement or, if not then, at the time when they gave notice of appeal.
The applications – did they contain a human rights claim?
70. Mr Chatwin first submitted then that we should identify the human rights claim under s.92(4)(a) as being contained in essence within the application that each appellant had made under the Ankara Agreement. He acknowledged that none of their applications made any reference to Article 8 or Article 1 of Protocol 1 or indeed to any ECHR article by name. Nevertheless, he argued, we should consider that human rights claims were implicit or impliedly present in all of the applications simply by virtue of the fact that they made reference to the applicant being in business or in self-employment and having monies, funds or property and thus fell within the ambit of “the right to respect for private life” under Article 8 and the right to possessions under Article 1 Protocol 1.
71. In our view it is simply not possible to read any of the applications in this way. None sought to rely on any rights other than those said to arise under the Ankara Agreement’s “standstill” provisions. All sought, thereby, to rely expressly on United Kingdom immigration rules applicable as at 1 January 1973. If Mr Chatwin’s reading were right, it is difficult to see how the s.92(4)(a) reference to “human rights claim” would not cover any claim or application made under the immigration rules or under EU law. There would be no meaningful distinction between a “human rights claim” and any other type of claim. We bear in mind also that the structure of the 2002 Act clearly contemplates that if a person wishes to make a human rights claim, he should say so. Certainly there is a need for a purposive construction of the notion of a human rights claim, but in these applications there was nothing which suggested that the appellants considered that the decision in question was unlawful or incompatible with their human rights under the Human Rights Act 1998 or that the concerns they had fell within the ambit of their human rights. At best Mr Chatwin's argument would only establish that the appellants identified matters within the subject-matter of the concept of “private life” or “possessions” , not that they identified any alleged violation of the same by reference to lack of respect or interference or disproportionate interference.
Human rights claims – were they validly made at the time of giving notice of appeal?
72. Mr Chatwin’s second main submission was that human rights claims under s.92(4)(a) had in any event been raised by the appellants in the grounds of appeal. He acknowledged that the first reference of any kind to a human rights claim based on “establishment” aspects of the right to respect for private life and the right to possessions was made in a letter accompanying the grounds of appeal lodged by the second, third and fourth appellants against the refusal of their applications relying on the Ankara Agreement. That, he said, was sufficient to bring all but the first appellant within the scope of s.92(4)(a). For there to have been a human rights claim within the meaning of s.92(4)(a), he submitted, the only prerequisite was that a human rights question had been raised at any time prior to the hearing of the appeal or at least by the time of receipt of notice of appeal: a human rights claim did not, he said, need to be made prior to the immigration decision.
73. In our view this line of argument has some unsatisfactory features. Firstly it appears to conflate the concept of a human rights claim with the concept of a human rights ground. It also clouds the apparent logical distinction made in Part 5 of the 2002 Act between s.92 (whose function is solely to determine whether there is an in-country right of appeal against the s.82 decision) and s.84 (which is solely concerned with the grounds the appellant may rely upon in any type of appeal, in-country or out-of-country). Furthermore, the logical sequence embodied for the most part in Part 5 of the Act appears to be: (1) claim, (2) immigration decision and (3) appeal/grounds of appeal: see ss.83, 83(1)(a), 94(2), 96 (and also paragraph 353 of the Immigration Rules (HC395 as amended)).
74. However, whilst we think that the drafters of the 2002 Act intended for the most part to employ the logical sequence we have just described, we do not think they fully completed the job. Here it is important to bear in mind first of all that the previous legislation, in the form of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, did provide by s.65 that a person could make a “human rights allegation” and that that was something which could be made after the decision in the form of an additional statement of grounds: see ss.74, 75 of the 1999 Act. Under this Act a human rights claim could take the form of a human rights allegation.
75. We can find nothing in the 2002 Act that expressly says that it is no longer possible for a human rights claim to be made post-decision in the form of human rights grounds of appeal.
76. Regard must also be had to s.120 of the 2002 Act. Although this is concerned with the requirement to state additional grounds for an application, it clearly contemplates that where an immigration decision within the meaning of s.82 has already been taken, the Secretary of State or an immigration officer may by notice in writing require a person to state additional grounds. Subsection (3) states that:
“A statement under subsection (2) need not repeat reasons or grounds set out in- (a) the application mentioned in subsection (1)(a), or (b) an application to which the immigration decision mentioned in subsection (1)(b) relates.”
77. This wording suggests that there is a degree of interchangeability about the concepts of claiming/applying and stating grounds, since it is contemplated here that grounds can be stated either at the application/ claim stage or at a post-decision stage.
78. Then there is s.8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004. Subsection (1) states:
“In determining whether to believe a statement made by or on behalf of a person who makes an asylum claim or a human rights claim, a deciding authority shall take account, as damaging the claimant’s credibility, of any behaviour to which this section applies.”
79. Subsection (5) states:
“This section also applies to failure by the claimant to make an asylum claim or human rights claim before being notified of an immigration decision, unless the claim relies wholly on matters arising after the notification” (emphasis added).
80. It is difficult to see how subsection(5) would have application in an AIT appeal if an asylum or human rights claim could only be made before the person was notified of an immigration decision.
81. There is also the contents of paragraph 5(7) of the Immigration (Notices) Regulations 2003. Although this arguably deals with the situation of what is to happen where a notice of decision is served which need not comply with requirements, inter alia, to advise of a right of appeal, it nevertheless, allows, at least in respect of a particular sub-set of immigration decisions, for a claim to be made post-decision.
82. To adopt the view that in all cases a claim had to be made prior to the decision would also conflict with existing case law. As was pointed out in the additional written submission made by the appellants’ representatives in response to our concerns about the relevance of the Mehmet Parmak case, the recent starred AIT determination, JM (Rule 62(7); human rights unarguable) Liberia* [2006] UKAIT 00009 states at para [33] that:

“The human rights position is different. The Appellant does not claim to have a status: he simply claims that he should not be removed. It is important to appreciate that, in any case in which this issue arises and to which the transitional appeal provisions apply, the Appellant is a person who, by asserting human rights grounds in his notice of appeal or one-stop notice to the Secretary of State, has made a “human rights claim” within the meaning of s113 (1) and hence also s92 (4) of the 2002 Act. He thus has an in-country right of appeal against the decision to issue removal directions against him under s10 of the 1999 Act as an overstayer if such a removal decision is ever made…. For all these reasons, if there are human rights issues to be raised, they should be raised at the moment when removal is threatened, not simply at the moment when it becomes theoretically possible. ”
83. This case (which was of course a transitional case) does confirm that a human rights claim could in principle be raised in a notice of appeal. What was being considered in JM was whether a human rights claim which had been made in the course of an appeal against a decision refusing to vary leave could be raised in subsequent proceedings (involving a removal decision). We need say no more about this, since the historic claim argument was not relied on by Mr Chatwin in any of the appeals before us.
84. We conclude that (subject to a further requirement we shall come to in a moment) a claim can qualify as an asylum or human rights claim under s.113 even though made post-decision even if not made until (but no later than) the time of the lodging of the notice (and grounds) of appeal. We say no later than because although a human rights claim may be made to the Secretary of State at any time, including after the decision, that claim can have no effect on the validity of an existing appeal. An appeal is either valid or invalid at the point in time when the notice of appeal is served, or it is not. No subsequent human rights claim can affect that.
The significance of the changes introduced with effect from 4 April 2005 for the making of an asylum and human rights claim
85. The further requirement, which we have referred to above as a third requirement, is that the asylum or human rights claim must be one “made…to the Secretary of State” (emphasis added). Plainly this requirement is an integral part of the s.113 definition.
86. Of course, prior to 4 April 2005 it was possible (on the above analysis) to make an asylum or human rights claim at the same time as lodging an appeal, since, up to that time an appeal to an adjudicator made in-country was effected by service of a notice of appeal on the Secretary of State. In this way any claim contained in the grounds of appeal automatically went to the Secretary of State.
87. However, that all changed as from 4 April 2005, with the creation of the AIT. Thereafter, notice of appeal is not served on the Secretary of State. Rule 6 of the 2005 Procedure Rules (headed “Giving notice of appeal”) specifies that:
“6.-(1) An appeal to the Tribunal may only be instituted by giving notice of appeal against a relevant decision in accordance with these Rules.
(2) Subject to paragraphs (3) and (4), notice of appeal must be given by filing it with the Tribunal in accordance with rule 55(1).” (emphasis added)
88. It might be suggested that these changes were not intended to prevent an in-country asylum or human rights claim from being made to the Secretary of State in the notice of appeal. However, even if that was not the intention, that plainly must be the effect of these changes. Further, the drafting of the 2005 Procedure Rules shows that specific thought was given to the implications of these changes for the giving of notice of appeal. Paragraphs (2)–(6) of rule 6 state:
“(2) Subject to paragraphs (3) and (4), notice of appeal must be given by filing it with the Tribunal in accordance with rule 55(1).
(3) A person who is in detention under the Immigration Acts may give notice of appeal either –
(a) in accordance with paragraph (2); or
(b) by serving it on the person having custody of him.
(4) A person who is outside the United Kingdom and wishes to appeal against a decision of an entry clearance officer may give notice of appeal either –
(a) in accordance with paragraph (2); or
(b) by serving it on the entry clearance officer.
(5). Where a notice of appeal is served on a custodian under paragraph 3(b), that person must –
(a) endorse on the notice the date that it is served on him; and
(b) forward it to the Tribunal within 2 days.
(6) Where a notice of appeal is served on an entry clearance officer under paragraph (4) (b), the officer must –
(a) endorse on the notice the date that it is served on him;
(b) forward it to the Tribunal as soon as reasonably practicable, and in any event within 10 days; and
(c) if it is practicable to do so within the time limit in subparagraph (b), send to the Tribunal with the notice of appeal a copy of the documents listed in rule 13(1). ”
89. It can be seen that paragraphs (4)-(6) identify two specific exceptions where it is still valid for service to be on somebody else: on an Entry Clearance Officer in the case of out of country appeals (paragraph (4)(b)) or on a “custodian” in cases of persons who are detained (paragraph (5)). In neither case is the government official the Secretary of State.
90. It can thus be seen that whether a person has an in-country right of appeal (at least when he has only made his human rights claim at the stage of lodging his appeal) will depend crucially on whether the claim was made before or after 4 April 2005. Those who made their human rights claim prior to 4 April 2005 –and who received an appealable decision in proper form – can have an in-country right of appeal. Those who made their human rights claim on or after 4 April 2005 cannot have an in-country right of appeal even assuming they have received an appealable decision in proper form.
91. Focussing for a moment on the former category, we are bound to say that we have reservations about the specific consequences. This interpretation entails acceptance that up until 4 April 2005 Turkish failed asylum-seekers were able to raise at the last-minute - and well after their asylum and asylum-related human rights appeals had been finally determined – human rights claims in the form of grounds of appeal in respect of a decision refusing them under the Ankara Agreement. Whilst that seems to us a wholly unintended consequence of the 2002 Act, we have applied the law as it seems to us to be.
92. It needs to be said that the situation we have described, whereby the 4 April 2005 changes prevented asylum and human rights claims from being validly made if only raised in the grounds of appeal, will not last. Once s.12 of the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006 comes into force, then there will be a different definition of “asylum claim” and “human rights claim”. Section 12 states:
“(1) Section 113(1) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002…shall be amended as follows.
(2) For the definition of “asylum claim” substitute –
““asylum claim” –
(a) means a claim made by a person that to remove him from or require him to leave the United Kingdom or would breach the United Kingdom’s obligations under the Refugee Convention, but
(b) does not include a claim which, having regard to a former claim, falls to be disregarded for the purposes of this Part in accordance with the immigration rules,”.
(3) For the definition of “human rights claim” substitute –
““human rights claim”-
(a) means a claim made by a person that to remove him from or require him to leave the United Kingdom would be unlawful under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 …(public authority not to act contrary to the Convention) as being incompatible with his Convention rights, but
(b) does not include a claim which, having regard to a former claim, falls to be disregarded for the purposes of this Part in accordance with immigration rules,”.”
93. This modified definition of “asylum claim” and “human rights” claim (when brought into force) will remove the current need for such claims, to be valid, to be made to the Secretary of State. Depending on consequential provisions made under this Act, the current bar on post 4 April 2005 asylum and human rights claims being validly made in the form of grounds of appeal may prove short-lived.
Application of our reasoning to the appellants’ human rights claims

94. The first appellant never lodged a human rights claim, even at the notice of appeal stage. The human rights claims lodged by the second, third and fourth appellants were all made (in the form of grounds of appeal) after 4 April 2005. The dates were 15 March 2006, 17 March 2006 and 14 March 2006 respectively. Accordingly none complied with the requirement of s.113 of the 2002 Act that they be made “to the Secretary of State”. Even though in the nature of the appeals process the contents of their claims became subsequently known to the Secretary of State (on receipt from the Tribunal of the grounds of appeal), that could not convert them into claims to the Secretary of State since the form in which they thus came to him was solely that of grounds of appeal in relation to an appeal which had already been made to the Tribunal.

Conclusion on whether there is an in-country right of appeal

95. Our conclusions on the main issue raised by these appeals are as follows:

(i) failed Turkish asylum-seekers who seek to rely on “standstill” provisions under the Ankara Agreement of 1963 by virtue of engaging in business or being self-employed in the UK (even assuming they have received an appealable immigration decision) do not have an in-country right of appeal under the legislative framework in place on 1 January 1973 (the relevant “standstill” provisions);

(ii) assuming they have received an appealable immigration decision, those who lodged their appeals since the coming into force of the 2002 Act but before 4 April 2005 do have an in-country right of appeal under s.92(4)(a) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 as amended if they have made an asylum or human rights claim to the Secretary of State as defined in s.113(1) of that Act;

(iii) however, those who lodged or lodge their appeals since the coming into force of the 2002 Act but on or after 4 April 2005 (as did all four appellants in this case), (even assuming they have received an appealable immigration decision) cannot have an in-country right of appeal unless they have earlier made an asylum and human rights claim to the Secretary of State when applying under the Ankara Agreement.

96. For the last-mentioned reason alone, in the case of all four appellants, there are no valid appeals before the Tribunal.

Signed:

DR H H Storey (Senior Immigration Judge)

Approved for electronic distribution